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Statuta v. Acts: Interpretation, Music,
and Early English Legislation
Desmond Manderson
I. INTRODUCrION AND METHODOLOGY
A. Statutes and Motets
Look at the monumental change that has been wrought between
the Magna Carta or the Carta Foreste of Edward I and the prodigious
legislation of the T"ldors. In language, form, and style, these written
laws seem almost unrelated; the former are as impenetrable and
limited in scope as the latter are arrogant in their power and
authority. Yet one grew with the utmost gradualness from the other.
Listen to the miraculous changes that have been rung between the
two-part organa and plainsongs of the thirteenth century and the
prodigious motets of Thomas Tallis, with up to forty distinct vocal
lines in mazy coalition. Here, too, there has been so much formal and
stylistic development that it is hard to imagine that one is an ornate
variation of the other. The languages of law and of music each
effected changes in purpose and normativity that an inquiry into
aesthetic and semiotic considerations will reveal. The similarities
between these parallel historical transformations suggest that these
changes extended far beyond the narrow boundaries of each discipline
and implicated every corner of the lives of those who lived then.
This Article is about the purposes and means of reading legal texts,
offering a broader understanding of the why and how of legal
interpretation. Many modem readers-and writers too-treat reading
as miners treat the earth. They are insensitive to the environment of
the text, its connotative play of light and shadow. In fiction and
nonfiction alike, they search for syllogisms, arguments that can be
extracted and stored, and discard the rest as mere impedimenta.
Ideas, facts, and events are nuggets of meaning; everything else is just
a bunch of old rocks. The result of this discursive strip-mining is a
1
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wasteland in which more has been lost than gained, and much that
has always been there is never found.
Any attempt to move beyond these routine strategies of reading
requires development through a practice, for interpretation is an act
to be done and not just a thought to be imagined. This Article deals
with early English statutes from the Magna Carta' (first obtained
from King John in 1215 and confirmed by Henry III in 1225) to the
laws passed in the reign of Henry VIII (from 1509 to 1547). At the
dawn of the common law, the statute had not yet achieved its present
authoritative status and clarity of form. It took its place alongside a
variety of other techniques of lawmaking, including the common law
system of judicial decisions, writs, plea rolls, charters, Year Books,
and so on. In fact, statutes were not a routine product of government
until toward the end of the period I am considering; at the same time,
the line between statutes and less formal pronouncements remained
unclear. Legislation is nonetheless the most discrete and tangible
kind of lawmaking, and the powers behind its generation and control
are especially overt. By trying to understand these lawmakers'
attitudes toward the meaning and role of the texts they created, we
can gain a view of the ways in which those with power saw the role
of the law. How, I ask, can we look at these particular legal
documents? How do they appear to look at us? How did their
authors look at the world?
In making these historical inquiries, I am particularly interested in
changing ideas of normativity and the law. Why does law exert a
normative authority over its citizens-in other words, why do we obey
the law? For John Austin, there can be no law without a sanction,
and it is from the threat of harm that our duty to obey arises. Both
Austin's model of the legal system and H. L. A. Hart's hypothetical
discussion of the formative period of English legal order, which in this
respect follows Austin's model, seem to be based on this under-
standing of "primitive" English law as a simple matter of force.2 On
one reading, the earliest English statutes, assembled in the 1786
1. 9 Hen. III (1225) (Eng.); 20 Edw. I (1292) (Eng.). These materials are readily available
in the original and translated in various editions of the Statutes at Large RUFFHEAD'S
STATUTES AT LARGE (Christopher Runnington ed., 1786) [hereinafter Runnington] and
STATUTES AT LARGE (Thomas Thomlins ed., 1811) [hereinafter Thomlins] provide different
editions and different commentaries. On the early English translations of the Latin and French,
see Howard J. Graham, Our Tong Maternall Maruellously Amendyd and Augmentyd The First
Englishing and Printing of the Medieval Statutes at Large, 1530-1533, 13 U.C.L.A. L REv. 58
(1965); see also RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATIONHOOD: THE ELIZABETHAN WRITING
OF ENGLAND (1992).
2. See Runnington, supra note 1; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (John Murray ed., 5th ed. 1954); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50-55
(1961).
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edition of the Statutes at Large, exemplify this conception of law as a
matter of coercion. According to Owen Ruffhead, these early statutes
seem "in particular instances, rather to be Provisions extorted by
some predominant influence, rather than laws instituted by the
concurring Assent of a regular legislature."3 Ruffhead cites many
statutes that were enacted without any formal indication whether or
how they received Parliamentary assent. As late as 1400, one bill ap-
parently became law even though it was rejected by the House of
Commons. 4  According to Ruffhead's reading, Austinian in its
implication, the laws of these early times exacted compliance from the
community simply because of the force behind them and not because,
as modem positivists argue, they were the formal and therefore
legitimate products of a recognized procedure of legislative develop-
ment.5
Retreating from his initial conclusion, however, Ruffhead insists
that we ought not judge the validity-that is, the communal
legitimacy--of a thirteenth-century enactment according to the formal
procedural criteria of the eighteenth century. The dichotomy between
coercion and formality as alternative normative frameworks is
anachronistic.6 Certainly it is true that lawmaking practice, like
Parliament itsel, was amorphous and unsettled in the first few
hundred years after the Norman invasion. But we must go much
further. It is not only procedure that changed in all that time. We
cannot assume that the meaning and normative authority of law itself
was the same then as it is now. To adopt such an assumption would
be to indulge in a presentism more grievous than that condemned by
Ruffhead, for it would be to judge the meaning of the thirteenth-
century legal order by the experiences of the twentieth century. What
was the purpose of statutes, then, and to whom were they addressed?
Who was expected to obey the law, in what capacity, and why? What
was the changing nature of the normativity of English law to which I
have alluded?
These are the questions I wish to explore in an effort to recapture
the radically different understanding of the province of statute and
law which molded and constrained the attitudes of early English law-
makers. In pursuing these questions I trace the shift over a period of
300 years in a wide range of attitudes toward legal purposes and
effects, from a legal world-view very different from one that is
3. Runnington, supra note 1, at v.
4. Id. at v-xiv; 2 Hen. IV, ch. 15 (1400) (Eng.).
5. See HART, supra note 2; JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORrTY OF LAW 47-50, 150-53,233-61 (1979)
[hereinafter AUTHORTY OF LAw]; see also Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 THE
MONIST 295 (1985) [hereinafter Authority, Law and Morality].
6. See Runnington, supra note 1.
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recognizably "modern." The story I tell is to some extent a familiar
one, and it is frequently presented in terms of the growth of political
power and administrative machinery, the ambitions of the Norman
invaders gradually being matched by their capacity.7  This ad-
ministrative-political story, however, is too simple an explanation.
Rather, we are witnessing nothing short of a change of consciousness
here, a change in the understanding of the purpose and functions of
law and of the relationship of the individual to the forces of legal
order. The statute has undergone a sea change between the thir-
teenth and the sixteenth century.
This consciousness manifests itself to us through all our senses. It
affects how we see and how we hear. It should not surprise us to
find, therefore, that parallel structural developments appear in
markedly different disciplines.8 Take an alternative locus of nor-
mativity-the church-and consider one of its most significant means
of expression-music. Explore one of the most complex and
important forms that musical discourse took, the motet, a form as
significant in the development of medieval music as the statute was
in the development of medieval law. The dramatic evolution in the
form and style of the motet, and the remarkable parallels which are
evident in the evolution of the statute, illustrate the profundity of the
changes that were taking place in ideas of normativity and conse-
quently illustrate the limitations of adopting a purely legal or political
explanatory model.
The history of English music resonates with a progression of
changes very similar to those found in the development of the statute
and also illustrates an emergence from a medieval to a modern
perspective on the world.' The word "motet" is used in England
from the fourteenth century onward to describe any polyphonic vocal
music written almost exclusively for liturgical use. It derives from the
diminutive form of the French mot, or word, and although the early
motets are quite different from the monophonic Gregorian chants that
preceded them, they share with them a commitment to the priority of
the text. This commitment is honored in the simplicity of the motet's
7. See THOMAS PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE (1958); THOMAS
PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD 1 (1949); THOMAS PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1922) [hereinafter
PLUNCHNETF, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION]; FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1895).
8. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1973).
9. See DONALD J. GROUT, A HISTORY OF WESTERN MusIc (1960); FRANK L. HARRISON,
MUSIC IN MEDIEVAL BRITAIN (1958); PETER M. LEFFERTS, THE MOTET IN ENGLAND IN THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1986); F.W. STERNFELD, MUSIC FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE
RENAISSANCE (1973); DAVID F. WILSON, MUSIC OF THE MIDDLE AGES: STYLE AND
STRUCTURE (1990).
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line and organization, in which the musical interest of the composition
never detracts from or overwhelms the words it speaks. The sacred
word is paramount. By the sixteenth century, however, motets have
also undergone a sea change. The motet begins to give effect to
complex forms of polyphonic organization which would have been
beyond imagining when the first motets were sung. So, too, the
statute had begun to give effect to complex forms of legal and social
organization that would have been beyond imagining when the first
statutes were enacted.
With its emphasis on the word and the form of words, the motet is
a metaphor for this Article's focus on statutory words and statutory
form. In addition, the motet is a genre of tremendous social and
cultural significance that underwent growth and transformation
parallel to changes affecting statutes. The musical sources illustrate
the nature and causes of those changes. Music also provides an
alternative language and thus a different way of imagining and
expressing the arguments. The changing sound and form of the motet
captures and communicates, in a different medium, fundamental shifts
in the processes of social order. The motet is not only a metaphor for
the development of the statute but an exemplification of it.
B. Interpretative Dimensions
1. Gazing at the Statute
The development of the motet acts as a counterpoint to my analysis
of the development of the statute and is one way in which I propose
to take a fresh approach to these sage old texts, to develop a
sensitivity to meaning beyond the literal, and to excavate the hidden
truths and treasures of legal interpretation which are buried there.
But my use of music is not the only way in which I approach early
statutes with a fresh eye and ear. Let us start with the contention
that legal conclusions in a judicial opinion or a statute, for example,
are influenced not only by rational ideas and legal doctrine but also
by aesthetic and formal considerations. Just as we listen to a piece of
music with an ear to its form and style, its structure and design, we
can learn much about the meaning and implications of "law" through
a thorough evaluation of these same factors. Musical and legal
interpretation turn out to have much in common.
The use of these factors in exploring the genesis and exegesis of
legal texts suggests above all a way of looking, in which the text is
treated as an elaborate and enlightening sign system in and of itself.
Clearly this is an approach much influenced by legal semiotics, from
the broad range of tools displayed in Roberta Kevelson's anthologies
19951
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to Peter Goodrich's provocative essays. ° What are the conse-
quences implied by this way of reading? What are the interpretative
choices involved in the reading of a legal document, such as a statute,
that such a methodology might suggest?
First, this kind of analysis focuses almost exclusively on the texts
themselves, rather than on, say, the economics, history, or sociology
of the culture in which they appear. The text is treated as a discrete
object worthy of separate study. It is bracketed as a work of art is
bracketed, removed from its quotidian functions and isolated for
contemplation." There is nothing unusual in this from the point of
view of legal research. As I have emphasized, however, this textuality
is not intended as a kind of legal formalism but, on the contrary, as
a means of revealing aspects of the social attitudes and values behind
the text.
Second, I am very much concerned with the words of a text. Our
society is uniquely literary. Other cultures set great store in the
senses of hearing, touch, and even smell as means of access to the
"truth," but modern Western society has accorded an unparalleled
and almost exclusive priority to the sense of sight. "Seeing is
believing" runs the old saw, while the rest of the sentence ("but
touching's the truth") is now forgotten. Other cultures transmit myth
and social meaning through nondiscursive artistic representation or
oral tradition, but we inhabit a culture in which the alphabet, writing,
and words-abstract, visual, linguistic-dominate as nowhere else in
the world. We are, says Marshall McLuhan, "typographic man" and
woman. In such a culture, texts occupy a unique cultural position. 2
But semiotics goes far beyond semantics, an analysis of the "meaning"
of words. Against a background of deconstruction and contemporary
jurisprudence alleging the indeterminacy of texts, this would beg the
10. See, eg., LAW AND SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1987-89); PETER GOODRICH,
LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS (1990); BERNARD S.
JACKSON, SEIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (1985); Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and Methods
of Legal Inquiry, 61 IND. L.J. 355 (1985).
11. See Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, in POETRY, LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT (Albert Hofstadter trans., 1971). The formalism of a work of art is further
emphasized and indeed overemphasized in, for example, MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS:
PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM (1958) and MARY MOTHERSILL, BEAUTY
RESTORED (1984).
12. For more on the prioritization and acuteness of the senses in different societies, and on
the origins, meaning, and implications of Western visuality and the dominance of written
language, see THE VARmTIES OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK IN THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SENSES (David Howes ed., 1991); JACK GOODY, THE LOGIC OF
WRITING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY (1986); MARSHALL McLuHAN, THE
GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN (1969). See also the works of
Derrida on the tension between writing and speech in Western culture. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (G.C. Spivak trans., 1976); A DERRIDA READER1 BETWEEN THE BLINDS
(Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991).
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question; rather, it is an approach attuned in particular to the
implications of word choice for the ways in which language is used
and to style and grammar. How meaning is conveyed is itself a
significant factor in interpreting a text. The kind of reading I am
undertaking involves a heightened sensitivity to the connotations of
words-to the ambient, the metaphorical, and the rhetorical effects of
language. 3
Third, if we take seriously the priority of the visual in Western
society, we must explore not only the connotations of words but also
the very look of the documents themselves. When I speak of the
"look" of a document, I am engaged in an evaluation of its form and
design and am positing meaning behind these elements. A complete
analysis of these questions would also ask us to pay attention to the
feel of the book: the coloring of the binding and paper, the dusty
sobriety of its pages, and so on. The law looks and feels a certain
way; this appearance is part of its intimidating authority. I leave such
matters for the future, however, pausing only to note that Peter
Goodrich has provided a suggestive introduction to such a project.14
This point aside, however, I am interested not in the content of a text
(the legal details, for example, of an Act) but in its style and design.
A piece of music, for example, is not simply "about" its subject
matter; its structure and style also communicate, aesthetically and
noncognitively. The same is true of a statute. The formal and
structural features of the text, the design of the document-in short,
all those aspects that connect, order, and present the concepts of a
text-are also analytical tools which help us understand how those
who created and recorded the text saw their world and the place of
law within it. These ideas about the "presentation" of documents
echo Monroe Beardsley's aesthetic theory. 5 The difference is that,
according to Beardsley, an appreciation of formal elements should be
entirely removed from the contaminants of culture and social value;
here these formal elements will be a mirror of and a window onto
them. Far from being radically removed, form and content are
radically entwined.
By focusing on the presentation, structure, and style of legal
documents rather than just their literal meaning, we approach the
world in which they were written through variables that were
generally deployed and altered subconsciously. We discern meaning
13. The distinction between denotation and connotation is discussed in relation to the work
of Roland Barthes in JACKSON, supra note 10, at 22-24.
14. See the discussion of the shape and form of law reports in GOODRICH, supra note 10,
at 233.
15. See generally BEARDSLEY, supra note 1.
19951
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in those matters of which legal authors were often unaware-look and
sound, style and form. What is revealed through the assumptions and
procedures that a society does not question will often tell us more
about its collective values than will that which is debated and
contentious. That which is self-evident is evidence of the self.16 I
therefore contend that an analysis of the properties of legal texts apart
from their content (except in the most general terms) can yield
evidence that will help us understand the role of law at different times
and in different places.
This exploration is not without implications for contemporary
practices. A semiotic and aesthetic interpretation of legislative form
can be valuably carried on to the present day; later, I suggest some
possible directions for such an analysis. Why, then, explore the style
and form of statutes through a historical example, rather than by
means of contemporary materials? By dealing with the formative
period of English statutes, we are in a position to assess those formal
and stylistic features which we now take for granted at the very
moment of their emergence. Our attention is drawn to the various
elements of the language and structure of the statutory form because,
one by one, we are privy to the processes of their birth and crystal-
lization. The adoption of a historical perspective thus allows us to see
the commonplace in a stark and novel context. Distance in time
permits distance in view. It is only with an eye sensitized by contact
with the strange that we can look anew at the familiar; it is only with
an awareness of the mutability of form that we can begin to question
the apparently eternal style of the present.
2. The Gaze of the Statute
This method of textual analysis is not just about where one seeks
legal meaning but also about why. It offers an expansion in the
melodic range-of legal interpretation as well as an enrichment of its
harmonic resources. 7 The law is an imperfect mirror, but a mirror
nevertheless, of the world beyond its bounds. If we study it carefully,
the law reflects back to us aspects of the world which birth to it. Such
a reading could not be further from a formalist interpretation of the
law, which excludes from consideration and interest all but the text
and the allegedly "legal" principles which generated it. 8
16. On the importance of background values to interpretative theory, see Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). For an analysis of style as an
interpretative technique, see PETER GAY, STYLE IN HISTORY 7 (1974).
17. This is a process of multidimensional enlargement that, it is often argued, has been
underway in Western music for the past 700 years or more.
18. See Ernest Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y
583 (1993); Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L REV. 403 (1992); Ernest Weinrib,
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It is undoubtedly true that the information contained in a case may
be faulty or flawed. If I wanted to know about the risks of blindness
associated with the use of certain drugs, surely I would go to a
medical text and not a legal case which touched upon the subject.
More generally, there is every reason for disbelief as to whether or
not the understanding of poverty, racism, or sexism contained in the
pages of a law report tells us much about the reality of those
problems. It is not, however, the information contained in a legal
document that is of interest here, but the way the document expresses
a world-view of those with power. Beyond the subject matter with
which it deals and the principles it seeks to enshrine, a judgment or
a statute may tell us about the way of looking at the world that called
it forth. Such a document provides us with a way of understanding
what was meant by "law" and "order" in the society that produced it.
It tells us about the role, power, authority, and responsibility
attributed to and claimed by legal institutions. Although they are
typically the ground and not the figure of legal texts, these are legal
questions in the most general sense, for they tell us how those who
wrote the law thought about the law itself.
My inquiry into statutory form, style, and connotation has a
particular focus. It asks how the texts that are the subject matter of
this Article reveal to us their authors and how they saw the world.
An analogy to the interpretation of a painting--encapsulated by
words such as seeing, looking, and perspective-may prove helpful.
Michael O'Toole, for example, seeks to understand art not only by
considering what a work of art "represents," but also by evaluating its
"composition" and "mood." "Mood" here refers to how the painting
"looks at" observers, the ways in which it tries to entice them into its
world or, alternatively, to exclude them. For example, are there
people in the painting? How do they look at us or past us? How is
perspective used? These and similar questions all relate to the
"mood" of a work of art and the nature of its gaze rather than our
own.
19
What a painting "represents" corresponds to the meaning and
purpose of a statute, and a painting's "composition," like that of a
piece of music, corresponds to the form and structure of a law. But
can a law have a "mood"? Can it gaze at you? One key to this
"Legal Formalism": On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 984 (1988); Ernest
Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987); see also Ken Kress,
Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1993); Stephen R. Perry, Professor
Weinrib's Formalism:t The Not-So-Empy Sepulchre, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 597 (1993);
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Symposium, Corrective Justice and
Formalism, 77 IOwA L. REv. 403 (1992).
19. MICAHEL O'TooLE, THE LANGUAGE OF DISPLAYED ART (1994).
1995]
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question may be found in the work of Michel Foucault, for whom
"gaze" (regard) was essential in explaining power. For Foucault, the
fact that the state so closely observes every aspect of the lives of its
citizens is a defining characteristic of the modem world. In the
Middle Ages, to be powerful was to be seen; it is now the case that
to be powerful is to see-to see everybody, to know their every move,
and to subject them to a penetrating and controlling gaze.2°
To consider the mood or gaze of a statute is thus to consider what
aspects of life or which groups are made visible to it. To whom does
the law "speak"? Does its gaze fall on everybody in the community
or only some? In what capacity are they addressed? A law may
address people on the horizon of its visibility in three ways. Are
those "captured" in this gaze treated as agents, whose role it is to
carry out the law-for example, where the law is procedural or
administrative in character? As subjects, who are expected to fit in
with the way the law orders the world around them? Or as objects,
whose behavior the law is intended actually to modify-as with,
perhaps, our modern understanding of the criminal law? Laws "look"
at different groups in different ways. The mood or gaze of the
statute, the dramatic changes it underwent from the thirteenth to the
sixteenth century, and the meaning of those changes in terms of law
as a normative order are the focus of this Article.
21
In my analysis of issues of normativity and law, the related ideas of
aesthetics and semiotics serve three main functions. They mandate an
interpretative process that sheds insight on the manifold meanings of
a text, by focusing on the content, structure, and mood of a
statute-the way that statutes look to us. They provide a direction
20. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLNE AND PUNISH (1975); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (Sheridan Smith trans.,
1975); see also HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT. BEYOND STRUC-
TURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS (wrrH AN AFrERWORD BY AND AN INTERVIEW wrI MICHEL
FOUCAULT) (1983). Discipline and Punish explains a fundamental shift in the nature of political
power at the end of the eighteenth century in terms of the institutional development of the gaze.
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault explores the notion of gaze at this time as an exercise of
medical and not political power, but this book more than any of his others explains the power,
intrusiveness, and political implications of ways of seeing. As the first sentence explains, "This
book is about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze."
THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC, supra, at ix.
21. "The law's gaze," understood literally, would be an error of anthropomorphism. A law
surely cannot look at us. Furthermore, like any text, it is constructed only by reading, it does
not come to us fully determined. Nonetheless, it is my contention, first, that through a legal text
we can decipher the gaze of its authors and, therefore, learn about their understanding of the
purpose and power of law. We see them gazing at the world through the window of the laws
they have written. Second, from the "other end" of the line of sight, those who are subject to
the law often experience law as watching them. We speak of what "the law" demands of us and
how "it" controls us. This is not merely a figure of speech but a phenomenon. When I employ
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for the interpretative inquiry, by focusing on the ways in which a
statute's gaze constructs its audience-how statutes' authors saw.
Finally, they invite a parallel focus of inquiry by suggesting ways in
which we can learn from analogous developments in the structure and
aesthetics of the motet-how the changing world of the statute was
heard. These three dimensions guide our exploration of ideas of law
and normativity and our excursion into the early history of English
legislation. And throughout, an underlying message urges a
complexity of reading and of inquiry that is often lacking in legal
interpretation: Look. And listen.
II. ENGLISH STATUTES FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
A. The Thirteenth Century: Statutes Without Norms?
1. The Language of Law
Statutes at Large, that great compilation of English enactments,
begins with the famous statutes of the thirteenth century, such as the
Magna Carta and the Statute of Westminster, and proceeds year by
year "down to the present day."'  First published in the late
eighteenth century, it is the most accessible historical record of
statutory law in England. With the opening words of the Magna
Carta, we enter a legal world very different from our own. Like all
statutes prior to 1275, the Magna Carta is written in Latin.' Even
the word "statute" is a translation, and one should, strictly speaking,
write of one statutum and several statuta. Indeed, Latin was generally
not a spoken language at all and was only understood by a small ad-
ministrative and ecclesiastical elite. The Latin used, moreover, was
not even classical Latin, but "law Latin"-verbose, difficult, and
idiosyncratic.
These statutes are not normative, if by normative we mean the
handing down of norms and values to a community with the assump-
tion that its members will or ought to take heed. Indeed, despite the
protodemocratic mythology that now surrounds them, Magna Carta
and other statuta of the period did not speak to the community at all;
they were intended to function as a record or document, only
accessible to a privileged few. We cannot even ask about the basis on
which statuta were obeyed at this time, since for the vast majority of
22. Runnington, supra note 1, at v.
23. The question of language is obviously important to this Article. Further clarification as
to the original language of statutes quoted in the text will be given in the footnotes. In all cases
the translations are those of Statutes at Large.
1995]
11
Manderson: Statuta v. Acts
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7: 317
the population they were literally incomprehensible. This constitutes
a fundamental difference from our current perception of the purpose
of statutory law.
These texts were shrouded in mystery. Like the meaning of sacred
objects, their significance was obscured to all but a few initiates; for
the rest, their power stemmed, if at all, from the very fact of their in-
comprehensibility.' 4 Writing at this time was still close to its origin
as a series of hiero-glyphs or "priestly signs" cloaked in the veil of
religion. Throughout his corpus, Jacques Derrida has argued that
Western thought, "logocentric" in nature, has treated writing as a
species of secondhand speech rather than recognizing its unique
qualities. In an illiterate society, however, these qualities derive solely
from the fact of written text rather than from its content. In the early
thirteenth century, then, law's power was a matter of form and not of
meang.
The use of Latin suggests that these statutes were more concerned
with iconic power than with specific norms of conduct-a message of
obedience to someone, rather than to some principle. The specific
wording of the statutes provides further evidence. Translated from
Latin, the confirmation of the Magna Carta begins:
Henry by the grace of God, King of England ... to all
Archbishops, Bishops, Abbotts, Priors, Earls, Barons, Sheriffs,
Provosts, Officers, and to all Bailiffs and other our faithful
subjects, which shall see this present Charter, Greeting.'
Here, the gaze of the statute is directed to a very small class of people
who are addressed personally, as if in a letter. "Greeting," says the
King. This beginning is commonplace. "Edward, to all to whom
these Presents shall come, sendeth greeting," begins the Carta
Forestae. "The King to his Treasurer and Barons of the Exchequer,
Greeting," says another statute. "The King unto his Justices of the
Bench, greeting," is also typical. The same form is used in various
writs which gave the king's judges jurisdiction over cases.26 The
24. See PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 21-27 (1987); Peter Goodrich, Literacy and the Languages of the Early
Common Law, 14 J. LAW & SOC. 422, 424-30 (1987) [hereinafter Goodrich, Literacy]; see also,
e.g., DERRIDA, supra note 12; A DERRIDA READER, supra note 12.
25. 9 Hen. III (1225) (Eng.); 20 Edw. I (1292) (Eng.). The original of this statute, and all
statutes quoted in the text through footnote 48 infra, is in Latin unless otherwise indicated.
26. 9 Hen. III (1225) (Eng.); 28 Edw. I (1300) (Eng.); Statute of Rutland, 10 Edw. I (1282)
(Eng.); Statute de Anno et die bissextili, 21 Hen. III (1236) (Eng.). For other examples of the
type, "[tihe King to the Justices of his Bench sendeth greeting," see 7 Edw. I, 1 & 2 (Eng.); 13
Edw, I, 4 (Eng.). I have noted the form as late as 7 Edw. 11 (1313) (Eng.). The distinction
between legislative and judicial functions was, therefore, not clearly distinguished in these early
years; see the work of the great thirteenth-century legal scholar HENRY BRACTON, ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND VOLS. 1-4, (G. Woodline ed., S. Thorpe trans., 1977) and
BRACTON'S NOTE BOOKS, VOL. 1 (F. Maitland ed., 1889).
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statutes are addressed to supervisors and not to the general
population; they do not establish norms but procedures. In sum, the
King was less interested in establishing communal norms of behavior
than in setting up an administrative structure to oversee legal norms
generated elsewhere.
This is, of course, the origin of the notion and power of the
"common law," for normative principles were filled in on a case-by-
case basis as the need arose. In this process the King showed little
interest; rather, his gaze fell upon a small group of functionaries,
whom he saw as "agents" and not "subjects." Indeed, the whole
structure of the common law "writ system" reflected this priority.
The annual Year Books, which had become central legal documents
by the end of the reign of Edward I, are complex records of the
practice of pleading; the substantive decisions of the cases they record
are largely irrelevant. Tune and again, once questions of procedure
have been resolved, the Year Book simply notes, "and so to
judgment." As Thomas Plucknett concludes, "What the judgment
was, nobody knew and nobody cared.""V The subject matter of law
was not important; who administered it was. This question of control
was especially important because the Normans, a conquering feudal
aristocracy in a foreign land, saw entrenchment of their institutional
power as paramount. Thus the endurance of the substantive Saxon
common law was not just unimportant, its preservation was indeed a
strategy of successful conquest-a pittance for the conquered.
The form and style of English vocal music exemplifies many of
these non-normative aspects of mood and gaze. By the beginning of
the thirteenth century, the heyday of Gregorian chant was past, but
the early polyphonic forms that soon came to be known as "motets"
had not yet been fully developed. Polyphony-the interweaving of a
number of independent musical lines-developed in organum, in
which a second part paralleled the tenor line of a plainsong (or, later,
a freely composed pes) at an interval of an octave or fifth; within a
few decades, the second part began to be sung in contrary motion to
the tenor, that is, corresponding note for note with the plainsong, but
rising where it fell and vice versa. Thus, although the two lines of an
organum differed, there was in these early works no independence of
parts; the second line was as yet entirely derivative of the tenor.'
Furthermore, there was not yet a modem system of notation, and the
meaning of early English notation, despite the many innovations it
pioneered, remained ambiguous and contextual for another cen-
27. PLUCKNETr, supra note 7, at 103-04.
28. GROUT, supra note 9, at 75-95; WiLsON, supra note 9, at 119-29.
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tury.29 For these reasons, an improvisational and informal character
pervades this music. The written record serves, as we shall see in
relation to statutory writing, as a memorial to the past rather than as
a prescription for the future. The writing of music-or of law-is
addressed to, and reminds, a small group of performers of their parts;
it is not intended to control the actions of a larger group.
The vocal line lacks beat or accent; it is highly ornamented,
melismatic rather than syllabic. Rhythmic variation is either nonexis-
tent or merely constituted by repeating one of a small number of
preset patterns or "modes." This limited approach to rhythm charac-
terizes English polyphony through the fifteenth century.' ° Listen to
the cryptic contours of the music, whose steady undulations reflect an
introspective rapture. It is an expression of rapture strangely
confined. The tonal range of the earliest polyphonic writing rarely
exceeds six notes within a single line, or a tenth from the lowest part
to the highest.3' There is no consciousness of rhythm or harmony as
independent musical variables. At every turn, the music is the
product of a limited gaze, a secret compact between performers which
seems, by its meandering, regular, interwoven lines, to exclude non-
participants rather than draw them in. This is sacral and iconic music,
alien to our modern ears, but not without force. One needs only to
listen to the cavernous, acoustical grandeur of Gregorian chant to
appreciate its ability to instill obedience, not through any direct
communication, but through spacious mystery. Is not some of this
character present in the statutes of the time, too-majestic, florid,
iconic, secret?
As with the early law discussed above, there is no evidence here of
normative intent. Statute and early polyphony are not intended to
communicate the power of the word to a lay audience. Unlike the
secular and vernacular love motets which came to occupy French
composers by the fourteenth century,32 the motet in England
remained as it was in the beginning, the product of established
institutions, using Latin texts for liturgical purposes. Both music and
law record the conversations of an elite, for an elite, in a language
and form that exclude the common man. Yet both early forms
convey, by the fact of the word or its sound, as distinct from its
meaning, the salutary awe that power inspires. In statutum or
organum, authority is not communicated but made manifest.
29. GROUT, supra note 9, at 198; LEFERTS, supra note 9, at 117-20.
30. LEFFERTS, supra note 9, at 142; WILSON, supra note 9, at 275.
31. WILSON, supra note 9, at 240, 284.
32. See id. at 236.
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2. The Content of Laws
Turning now to the subject matter of thirteenth-century statutes, we
find further evidence to support our understanding of their limited
purpose. They contain few provisions that can be interpreted as
establishing general norms of behavior; generally, their purpose was
either to clarify the procedure for obtaining writs before the King's
courts or to regulate the conduct of the King's officials throughout the
country. The mood is often that of a master bringing his unruly
agents to heel. For example, in one 1266 statute, "bailiffs, sheriffs,
and other officers" are instructed to "make account to the Treasurer."
So too, An Ordinance for Ireland (1288), a kind of letters patent to
the Justice of Ireland, likewise sets limits on his personal authority.33
Goodrich has emphasized the sacred and iconic nature of Latin
texts of the Middle Ages, arguing that they were not functional
documents but relics of sovereignty. Statute laws had this character
for the illiterate peasantry, but their immediate effect on a literate
ruling elite was, on the contrary, decidedly administrative and
practical. While they may have seemed to most people to be "holy
mysteries... stored in sacred hiding places"-a characteristic we have
already noted in both statutes and music-they were not addressed to
most people.' To their intended audience, statutes were,
paradoxically, instructions and not icons.
The non-normativity of statuta, then, can be found both in their
iconic communal authority and in the narrow focus of their contents.
Here, too, we are dealing with a language that was opaque and
mysterious to the majority of the population, for Latin was the
language of music as it was of religion and law. But it is not merely
the language of musical texts which suggests the limited normative
compass of these early forms. A motet, recall, is "a little word," an
etymology that reflects the prevailing attitude that music ought not
distract from the holy words it conveys. This view of the subordinate
function of music dominated the Catholic church at least until the
Renaissance and, to a considerable extent, still guides Orthodox
liturgy. Monophonic writing such as Gregorian chant provides a clear
example: for those few who understood it, the words of the liturgy
were of primary importance, and music merely the vehicle for their
communication. Consequently, even at its most melismatic, the line
and rhythm of the music closely parallel the words in question.
33. Statute de Scaccario, 51 Hen. III, 5 (1266) (Eng.); An Ordinance for Ireland, 17 Edw.,
chs. 1-8 (1289) (Eng.). See also Statute of Westminster, the 1st, 3 Edw., chs. 24, 26-31 (1275)
(Eng.).
34. See Goodrich, Literacy, supra note 24, at 430.
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Although florid at times, the musical demands of the composition
never detract from the focus on the "little words" it speaks.
Early polyphonic writing likewise did not attempt to convey to a
wider audience, by the use of musical form, the meaning of Latin
words; music was the channel through which the words were given
voice, but it was not a symbolic language on its own. Rhythm,
melody, key, and harmony-music qua music-were not yet indepen-
dent variables imbued with independent meaning. Furthermore, early
English composers made no attempt to relate the text to the music.
A motet was an abstract, formal vehicle for the delivery of words, but
while it "presented" a text or texts, it did not "project" or express
them.35 The music itself did not convey value and meaning. It is
true that for those who could understand the Latin being sung, the
musical form may perhaps have served as a channel for its transmis-
sion, but even this limited communicative aspect of the motet must
not be overstated. Most motets in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries were polytextual as well as polyphonic: different singers sang
not only different musical lines simultaneously, but different texts as
well. It is likely, then, that at this point the motet was not even an
effective transmitter of the words of the text.36
Admittedly, the Dies Irae and other "sequences" that originated in
twelfth-century Gregorian chant did attempt to use music's expressive
potential to convey the mood and ideas of the words. The "Day of
Wrath," whose sound and beat instills the terror described in the text,
is an archetype of the persuasive force of music, then and now. But
it was not until centuries later, in the part-writing of composers such
as Josquin or Thomas Tallis, that this idea of a specific relationship
between words and music-word painting-becames pronounced. At
that point, when music was actually designed to persuade the listener,
aurally and emotionally, of the truth of the words it set--of the mercy
of Jesus, the grandeur of the Lord, or the sorrowful peace of the
dead-then and only then did music begin to exert a normative effect
on its listeners. Only then had music developed from an imperfect
medium for communication to a means thereot
In their early forms, then, neither English music nor law attempt to
originate norms applicable to the community as a whole. On the
contrary, many early statutes merely confirm existing and customary
principles of law. Magna Carta and Carta Forestw are typical,
declaring that "the city of London shall have all the old liberties and
customs, which it used to have," that no one "shall be distrained to
35. LFrFERTs, supra note 9, at 155, 187-89; WILSON, supra note 9, at 285, 320, 344.
36. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 126; LEFFERTs, supra note 9, at 155.
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make Bridges and Banks, but such as of old time and of right have
accustomed to make them," and that the ownership of forests and the
practice of the King's Rangers shall be "as it hath been accustomed
at the time of the first Coronation of King Henry our Grandfather"
(who himself had upheld the law as it existed in the time of Edward
the Confessor)." Such references to keeping things as they were in
the days of Henry III was quite common."
The reduction of a custom to writing undoubtedly has some effect,
for it reinforces that state of affairs and gives official imprimatur to
a principle that might previously have existed only informally or
imprecisely. Moreover, it may restore principles that have been
neglected or fallen into abeyance. It is, however, a very different and
more limited kind of lawmaking than that which we now understand
legislation to be. In claiming that this kind of lawmaking is not nor-
mative, at least as we now tend to understand that word in relation
to statutes, I mean to emphasize that the reduction to statutory form
of existing customs does not itself generate new or refined norms or
values within a community. Declaratory law is different in both its
function and status.
This argument addresses a difference of opinion between Charles
McIlwain and Thomas Plucknett. Mc~lwain argues that early statutes
affirmed the common law and did not "make" new law, while
Plucknett rejects this argument and uses evidence, such as the Year
Books, to assert that statutes were seen as instituting "special" or
"novel" law. Acknowledging the possibility of the creation of novel
law by statute, however, does not detract from the generalization that
I am making about statute law as a whole. In addition, Plucknett by
and large discusses a period a century later than my current focus, by
which time attitudes toward statutory law had already changed, as I
shall later explain. In fact, in discussing slightly earlier statutes dating
from the reign of Edward 1 (1272-1307), Plucknett himself emphasizes
that the line between statute and common law was weakly drawn. He
suggests that statutes were received not as superior law but as part of
the common law. "[T]hose charters and statutes are merely adjuncts
to the unwritten common law, and . . . wholly partake of its
nature."39 The prime function of this written portion of unwritten
37. Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, chs. 9 & 15 (1225) (Eng.); Carta Forestm, 9 Hen. III, chs. 4 &
5 (1225) (Eng.).
38. For another example, see Statute de Marlberge, 52 Hen. III, ch. 10 (1267) (Eng.): "[Tihe
Turn shall be kept as it hath been used in the Times of the King's noble Progenitors." Almost
a century later this same phrase was used to confirm the validity of those statutes and, in
particular, Charters which had been made in the past. See 36 Edw. III, ch. 1 (1362) (Eng.).
39. PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, supra note 7, at 14.
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law was declaratory; as Plucknett says, a statute was "a memorandum
about a point of custom. '
What was called a statutum often seems to modern eyes more like
a narrative or a history, intended to record the events of the court
rather than to alter the law or, a fortiori, social behavior. In other
words, the statute fulfilled a descriptive rather than a prescriptive
function. The following statute on bastardy, which dates from 1235,
is a good example:
All the bishops instanted the Lords, that they would consent, that
all such as were born afore Matrimony should be legitimate, as
well as they that be born after Matrimony... foreasmuch as the
Church accepteth such as legitimate. And all Earls and Barons
with one voice answered, that they would not change the Law of
the Realm, which hitherto have been used and approved.41
Undoubtedly, this tale of the rejection of the Bishops' appeal is a way
of describing and confirming the current law, but according to our
modern understanding of a statute, nothing happened. No law was
passed; there was no change to the Law of the Realm. This "statute"
is merely the story of a political event. Law, politics, and history here
are hardly distinguishable.42
The law in early statutes does not presume to generate or define
social norms. The normative grounds of the wrong are not to be
found in legislation. They are rooted instead in popular custom or
noble power. In this sense, statuta in this period provide no indepen-
dent "reasons for action." Even apparently "penal" laws demonstrate
this character. In the Carta Foresta, for example, it is written: "No
man from henceforth shall lose either Life or Member for killing of
our Deer: But if any man be taken, and convict for taking our
Venison, he shall make a grievous fine."'43 The law did not make it
an offense to kill royal venison-it nowhere stated, "No man shall kill
our deer." The offense (that is, the normative principle) was assumed
to exist prior to and independent of the passage of the law. The
statute only dealt with-and, admittedly, substantially amended-the
kind of punishment that was to be imposed. This statute is typical in
the way in which it built on pre-existing normative principles.
40. C.H. McILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT (1910); C.H. MCILWAIN, MAGNA
CARTA AND THE COMMON LAW (1917). These are discussed in PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 26-31; PLucKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I,
supra note 7, at 13-14. See also the similar point made in POLLOcK & MArrLAND, supra note
7, at 178-80.
41. 20 Hen. III, ch. 9 (1235) (Eng.).
42. PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 20 ("Parliament
at this time meant an event rather than an institution.").
43. 9 Hen. III (1225) (Eng.); 28 Edw. I (1299) (Eng.).
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Another law dealt with the penalty for "the ravishment of a ward,"
but it, too, did not establish the meaning or wrongfulness of the
conduct in the first place.' Modem statutes, by contrast, invariably
begin with a statement and definition of the offense and treat the
question of penalty as subsidiary. Undoubtedly, the wrongfulness of,
for example, taking venison or ravishing wards was a necessary
implication of the statute. Nevertheless, the implication of wrongful-
ness did not arise from the statute but from what everybody already
knew constituted wrong conduct.
Those few laws which did establish penalties and punishments were
vague and open to judicial discretion. While the judge thus had more
power than modem law allows, being free to impose any penalty he
deemed appropriate, written law had less power than its modem
counterparts. Providing a specific penalty for an offense was almost
unheard of. In reading these documents, one gets the impression that
lawmakers at this time did not conceive of the concrete application of
their laws. They did not imagine the transgression of laws or the
punishment of transgressors, Such details were left for others to fill
in, just as the improvisational character of music gave enormous
freedom to the individual performer of an organum. For modem
legislators, of course, the specific offense and the specific penalty do
go together. The modern judge, like the modem musician, is subject
to far greater constraint. From one angle, this is a consequence of the
intrusiveness and detail of contemporary laws, but from another angle
it reflects how little the King and his advisers in the thirteenth century
saw the law as a means of literally enforcing their will on the
population. It is a mistake, then, to conceive of early statutes as an
expression of coercive power, when the act of coercion was not
envisaged by those in power and, on the contrary, was left for others
to fill in as they saw fit.
The lack of specific penalties was, to be sure, partly a function of
the limited reach of the King's power and of the very limited
machinery through which laws could be enforced. England was still
over 350 years away from a standing army and almost 600 years from
a regular police force. A lack of resources, however, was not the only
factor that thwarted the establishment of a comprehensive and
rational system of penalties and punishments. Systems of penalties
were not unknown, having existed in some detail in the codes of the
Anglo-Saxon kings. Furthermore, the practical difficulty of a
particular course of conduct is never a fully satisfactory explanation
for its nonexistence. What is done in a society-and what is left
44. 20 Hen. III, ch. 6 (1235) (Eng.).
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undone-is valuable evidence of how that society thought. Except
during those great moments in history when the boundaries by which
acceptable conduct is determined become wholly inadequate to the
needs of society and new boundaries of the conceivable force a
redefinition of the possible, thought and behavior live in symbiotic
harmony.
It could also be argued that leaving so much to judicial discretion
merely reflected the close relationship between King and bench.
Parliament was also a court, and judges were members of the King's
council. It would be wrong to think, then, that statutes conveyed
instructions to a mysterious, removed, or abstract judiciary. Despite
these close relations, however, silence conveys meaning, and the
absence of certain matters within statutes must be explained. Given
the mystique and status of statutory law, the fact that statutes were
the principal means of speaking to absent officials (whether removed
in space or time), and that many cases were decided away from Par-
liament and the Crown-given this, what was included and what was
omitted seem important indications of what was most valued.
Where statutes did actually "change the law," justification seems to
have been required. The Statute de Marlberge, as if by way of
apology, begins, "The Realm of England of late had been disquieted
with manifold Troubles and Dissensions; for Reformation whereof
Statutes and Law be right necessary. .. ." Yet even here, about
70 percent of the "chapters" (the subdivisions of the statute) are
either procedural, declare the existing law, or provide limited
exceptions to it.' In general, then, statuta are descriptive, not
prescriptive; they organize the legal system but do not change the law,
and in the main they are addressed to functionaries. According to
Austin's theory of the law, we are not in the province of
jurisprudence at all, since laws that are declaratory, or specific rather
than general in application, or to which no sanction applies, are
"imperfect" or "improperly termed" laws.47
45. 52 Hen. III (1267) (Eng.).
46. Id. at chs. 3, 5-11, 13-16, 18, 20, 23-24, 26-29. The meaning of "chapter" has changed
over the years, a matter I discuss below. In the period presently under consideration, the word
"statute" was generally used to describe the document recording all the enactments of a
parliamentary session (normally one a year); the "statute" is divided into chapters, each of which
covers a particular issue or problem. A statute therefore is a historical unit and a chapter a
purposive subdivision of it. It is with this distinction in mind that I use these words in this
Article, although the distinction was not as clear or systematized in the period about which I am
writing. See infra note 90. The use of the word "chapter" to divide each statute perhaps
suggests a narrative quality to modem ears. But this is anachronistic, for the association of
"chapter" with literary structure is relatively modem. A chapter originally denoted merely a
division or heading (from caput, head); we still refer to organizations or religions as having
chapters, meaning branches. See 3 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 28-29 (2d ed. 1989).
47. AusTIN, supra note 2, at 97-98, 102-03.
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R The Later Thirteenth Century: A Changing Mood
1. Visibility: The Statute of Westminster
Throughout my discussion, I have intentionally used words related
to sight, although, as I have noted, this imagery in part reflects merely
the dominance of the visual in Western culture. The majority of the
English population was not yet illuminated in the eyes of the
powerful; therefore the application of the law to them was neither
important nor even clearly imagined. Legislation was seen largely as
a means of communication between the King and those associated
with him, and the character of statutes reflected this narrow and
personal gaze. This pattern of lawmaking continued for many years,
but an important signpost of change appeared with the enactment of
the first Statute of Westminster in 1275. Coming across it in the grey
and dessicated pages of the Statutes at Large (how apposite is that
word parch-ment), one feels a sudden shock at the new tenor of the
law, its passion, its determination, and its mood. After over half a
century of Henry III's dusty rule, King Edward took command,
raising a new voice in the realm:
And because the State of his Kingdom and of the Holy Church
had been evil kept, and the Prelates and religious Persons of the
Land grieved many ways, and the People otherwise intreated
than they ought to be, and the Peace less kept, and the Laws less
used, and the Offenders less punished than they ought to be, by
reason whereof the people of the land feared the less to
establish ....
Here are the beginnings of a change of consciousness with profound
legal effects. For the first time, a statute refers not to Archbishops
and Bishops, Sheriffs, and Bailiffs, not even to "freemen,"49 but to
"the People." The substantive clauses of the statute continue in the
same spirit: "First the King willeth and commandeth... that common
Right be done to all, as well Poor as rich, without respect for Per-
sons."'  Not only are the words different but so is the language in
which they are expressed; the Statute of Westminster is the first
English statute written in French rather than Latin. As Frederick
Maitland noted, it is hardly now possible to write a paragraph of law
without using words of French derivation: contract, tort, property,
48. Statute of Westminster, the 1st, 3 Edw. 1 (1275) (Eng.). The original of this statute, and
all statutes quoted in the text through footnote 100 infra, is in French unless otherwise indicated.
All emphasis henceforth is in the original translation.
49. See Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, chs. 9 & 15 (Eng.).
50. Statute of Westminster, the 1st, 3 Edw. I, ch. 1 (1275) (Eng.).
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treason, crime, and misdemeanor; parliament, court, judge, juror,
plaintiff, and defendant, to name only the most obvious. 1 French
was, admittedly, the language of the conquering Normans and was not
by any means the "common tongue." Neither was "law French" the
same as "spoken French," but rather a written language distorted by
complex grammatical rules and highly technical terminology. It is fair
to say that it only resembled spoken French, much as cheez wiz
resembles hollandaise. Nevertheless, unlike Latin, "law French" was
based on and recognizable as a living, spoken language; in fact, "law
French" was constituted so strangely exactly because, unlike Latin or
English, it had no prior history of written use at all.52 The official
language of Parliament became, as its French etymology implies, a
spoken language.
What does this change imply? First, as Plucknett suggests, a
powerful class of legal specialists was developing, clerks and not
clerics, "who understand Latin but are really only fluent in French."
At the same time, the use of law French represented an effort to com-
municate directly to a wider audience, an attempt to make law
something that was not only written down for those few who could
read but also spoken so thatmany could hear. Legislators clearly
intended the Statute of Westminster to become widely known." This
implies the assumption that a statute can change behavior and
attitudes, and, further, that adequate knowledge of its terms itself has
this result. With this statute, we witness the very birth of normativity
in English statutes-that is, of law understood not only as an
administrative tool and an icon of power, but also as a means of
influencing what people do and what they believe to be right. The
little words of the law are beginning to be seen as a mind-altering
substance.
Of course, invoking "the people," in the thirteenth or twentieth
century, is frequently a way of facilitating their exploitation and
manipulation. Whether or not we are cynical about the King's use of
such language, the emergence of this kind of rhetoric is significant.
For the first time, the law saw the common people and acknowledged
that they were subject to the legal system and that their support for
it somehow mattered. They were now on the horizon of visibility. It
was now possible for the people to be "subjects" and "objects" of
statutes, dramatis personae in the legal system, and not merely its
scenery. This gaze, beginning to be focused ineluctably upon the
51. POLLOCK & MArTAN, supra note 7, at 80-81.
52. POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 7, at 82; Goodrich, Literacy, supra note 24, at 433-36.
53. PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDwARD I, supra note 7, at 81. See also PLUCKNETT,
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 11.
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whole of humanity, did not prove an unmitigated boon. Without it,
however, our modem legal system and our modem understanding of
law simply could not be.
Foucault dates the emergence of individual visibility as an
instrument of social control from the eighteenth century, but evidently
people began to be "seen" much earlier. Philippe Ari~s, for example,
records that in and around the thirteenth century, the European view
of death began to change. We see the slow individualization of
tombs, of wills, of bequests-all techniques designed to record the
existence and guard the memory of the deceased as an individual, and
not simply as part of the ebb and flow of the community. In Arias's
words, we pass from an era in which death was "tame" to one in
which people were acutely aware of "the death of the selfl" We are
witnessing the emergence of a self-awareness of individuality.'M
It is often said that the world of the Gregorian chant, like that of
the early English statute, is devoid of subjectivity and individualism.
There is a two-dimensionality here because only one line of music is
heard at a time. But by 1275, the date of the Statute of Westminster,
the motet had developed with surprising rapidity toward part differen-
tiation, independent melodic lines, and greater rhythmic variety.55
Musical notation, too, had developed with some rapidity and inven-
tiveness in England, striving to express not only a standard corpus of
rhythmic modes or relations but also the precise value of each
individual note. Franco of Cologne's important musical treatise, Ars
musica mensurabilis (circa 1280), brought coherence to these develop-
ments, which soon spread to England.56 In all these ways, the motet
evinces an entirely different vision from plainsong, a vision that
recognizes the individuality of each participant. The changing style
and form of a composition, like the wording of a statute, reflect the
contrasting priorities of its authors. Earlier artists and musicians-and
earlier lawmakers-were not incompetents, struggling along with
techniques and powers inadequate to their tasks and desires; their
intentions were different, the product of a different aesthetic.
The Statute of Westminster and the developing motet both reflect a
revolutionary awareness of the wider world, and the gaze of each
expresses the all-encompassing perspective of its authors. Undoubted-
54. PHILIPPE ARIus, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH (HOMME DEVANT LA MORT), 5-202 (H.
Weaver trans., 1991); see also MCLUHAN, supra note 12 (giving a more specific look at the
sources of individuality in the alphabet and the printing press); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES
OF THE SELF. THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
55. GROUT, supra note 9, at 52, 109. Indeed, early motets display a more complete
independence of line than later writing, since there is as yet little awareness of harmony.
Consequently, the melodic lines of the motets of this period are surprisingly dissonant. The
emphasis at this time on individuality in part writing is also reflected in the use of polytextuality.
56. WiLSON, supra note 9, at 255.
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ly the statute, at the very beginning of this process, signifies in legal
as well as artistic terms only the first stirrings of a trend. Until 1324,
statutes frequently revert to Latin, which was used for centuries
thereafter in writs and legal jargon, and, until 1731, as the official
language of judicial records.5 7 Many of the provisions of the Statute
of Westminster were administrative instructions to officials that, in
particular, aimed to curb their abuses and corruption, but not all its
provisions were of this kind. Chapter 13 of the statute, for example,
provided that, in the case of rape, the King may bring an action if no
other action is brought within forty days and expressly established a
penalty of at least two years imprisonment. In contrast to the earlier
statute for "ravishment of a ward," here enforcement and punishment
were specifically articulated. The law was beginning to be a physical
presence in people's lives.
2. Normativity: The Statute of Winchester
The statutes in the years immediately following the Statute of
Westminster generally remained products of a limited and admini-
strative gaze. They dealt, for example, with the procedure to be
followed by a coroner, or they announced certain aspects of the law,
not to enhance its normative power, but rather to create "a perpetual
Memory" thereof5 The functions of statutes as declarations and
records of the law still seemed to outweigh their use as a vehicle of
change. The Statute of Westminster, however, marked an important
beginning in which the law's gaze begans to widen and the purposes
ascribed to it began to change.
It is a gradual process. By and large, where the law was cognizant
of "the people," they were seen more as its subjects than its objects.
The second Statute of Westminster, written ten years after the first,
generally provided for remedies in situations where none previously
existed, facilitating the community's use of the legal system, but not
directly operating on the attitudes of its members. It is in this sense
that I mean that people were not yet "objects" of the law. While the
general population were now seen as subjects of the law, there was
not yet a common belief in the capacity of the words of the law to
change their values or conduct. Rather, procedures and rules were
still largely seen as the legal objects to be formed and reformed by
the law.
57. See 4 Edw. I, Stats. 1-3 (1276) (Eng.); 4 Geo. II, ch. 26 (1731) (Eng.); POLLOCK &
MArrLAND, supra note 7, at 83.
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Laws relating to felonies, however, had gained greater prominence
in the statutory law by this time, and this is precisely the kind of law
that treats its audience members as "objects." One chapter of the
second Statute of Westminster is particularly interesting:
That if a Man from henceforth do ravish a Woman married,
Maid, or other, where she did not consent, neither before nor
after, he shall have judgment of Life and a Member. And
likewise where a man ravisheth a Woman married, Lady,
Damosel, or other, with Force, although she consent after, he
shall have such Judgment as before is said .... 9
This is the clearest statement so far of the felony of rape. In contrast
to earlier penal provisions, the text itself states and defines the terms
of the crime and provides a specific penalty for its breach.
Henceforth, rape is truly a statutory offense.
Significantly, in a 34-page-long statute, these eight lines are
practically the only ones in French.' While written law French was
hardly well understood in semiliterate England, it reached a wider
audience than did Latin, and from this wider base the terms of the
law could be further spread by word of mouth. This striking use of
French indicates that lawmakers saw the chapter as a different kind
of law requiring a more accessible language. We are dealing here
with an especially normative provision, and, conscious of this, a
special effort was made to render its terms more widely comprehen-
sible. The idea was gaining ground that a statute should communicate
to all people (rather than just to certain officials), should affect the
conduct of all people, and if necessary should force their compliance
through the imposition of punishment. The system of legislation had
begun to take on a recognizably modem form, reflecting an ideal of
state control over every aspect of social life.
So, too, the musical notation promulgated by Franco of Cologne
took hold in England by the beginning of the fourteenth century.
This was a language able, at last, not just to represent a standard
repertoire of rhythmic precedents but also to define with precision the
relative duration and pitch of each individual note, a way of writing
that differed from its predecessors such as English mensural notation
59. Statute of Westminster, the 2nd, 13 Edw. I, ch. 34 (1285) (Eng.).
60. Id. The rest of chapter 34 is in Latin and concerns the lands of women who abscond and
the abduction of nuns. Chapter 49, which prohibits the King's servants from taking land, church,
or tenement which is the subject of a legal dispute, is also in French. Lord Coke suggests that
this is because the chapter relates to an earlier statute written in French; it has also been
suggested that chapter 49 belongs to a later statute and was recorded here by mistake. Id. at
ch. 49. See the footnotes to this statute in Thomlins, supra note 1.
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as the alphabet differs from hieroglyphics.61 It was a system of
musical language in a recognizably modern form, reflecting an ideal
of authorial control over every aspect of performance.
The Statute of Winchester, also dating from 1285, is wholly in
French and demonstrates a stronger commitment to the normative
force of the law. Here we find provisions relating to the apprehen-
sion of felons and robbers that require "people dwelling in the
country" to assist in the apprehension of offenders or to answer
themselves for the damage done.62  This law is not merely
declaratory or procedural; common people are laid under new
obligations purely by virtue of the statute. They are now treated as
agents who are expected to obey and carry out the law.
Three structural features of this provision underscore its normative
character. First, a date is set for its entry into force: "Easter next
following." 63 The year 1285 marks the debut of a provision saying
when a statute is to begin to apply, now a characteristic of every
modern statute. The second Statute of Westminster is still clearer: "All
the said Statutes shall take Effect at the Feast of St. Michael next
coming."' What does this mean? The statute is not just seen as a
statement of intent or as a record, but as an event with concrete
effects. The provision that assigns a date for a statute's entry into
force represents a fundamentally new attitude; the statute is no longer
seen as an inert string of words but is now seen as a statement of
intention to alter events in the future. On the one hand, such a
provision represents an increased awareness of the "real world" and
a desire to increase the statute's interaction with it. On the other
hand, it represents a new faith in people's capacity to change their
behavior. The relationship of the idea of law both to the possibility
of change and to the scope of its world is being reconstructed here.
It is only in this context that the question of "when" arises. When is
this law to change the world? It is the formulation of this novel
question that makes entry provisions necessary.
Second, the entry into force provision of the Statute of Winchester
was postponed. It "shall not incur immediately, but it shall be
respited until Easter next following, within which Time the King may
see how the Country will order themselves, and whether such Felonies
and Robberies do cease."' The King evidently believed that the
61. For the normative implications of the alphabet in the development of Western
consciousness, see IVAN ILLICH & BARRY SANDERS, ABC: THE ALPHABETIZATION OF THE
POPULAR MIND (1988); McLuHAN, supra note 12.
62. Statutumn Wynton, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, chs. 1-2 (1285) (Eng.).
63. 11 at ch. 3.
64. Statute of Westminster, the 2nd, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 1, ch. 50 (Eng.) (original in Latin).
65. Statutum Wynton, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, ch. 3 (1285) (Eng.).
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mere threat of the impending statute might change people's conduct.
No more normative and instrumental understanding of law could be
imagined. The fact of the law, and even the fact of future law, was
expected to have a behavioral effect.
Third, normativity requires communication. Only if the content of
the norm is adequately and widely communicated can it influence
behavior and attitudes. Accordingly, the law requires "[t]hat Cries
shall be solemnly made in all Counties, Hundreds, Markets, Fairs, and
all other Places where great Report of People is, so that none shall
excuse himself by Ignorance."' This change, from written law to
spoken law, appears to be a logical extension of the change from
Latin to French. Just as the Statute of Westminster introduced a law
that could be spoken as well as read, the Statute of Winchester
provided for a law that was not only to be spoken but to be heard.
Statutory law was becoming increasingly prominent, reflecting a
rapidly growing faith in its capacity to enter our minds.
Later, the Articuli Super Cartas confirmed again the Magna Carta,
the Carta Forestae, and the Statute of Winchester, with the important
addition that the statutes were to be read publicly four times a year
by the sheriffs. De Tallagio non Concedendo was to be read in
cathedral churches, and those who broke its terms were to be excom-
municated.67 Members of the public were now expected to obey the
law and to change their lives accordingly. Given these expectations,
ignorance of the law emerged as a problem which public readings
were meant to overcome. It is not enough to say that public visibility
of the law was becoming a vital part of its normative ambitions. The
law was now more than visible-it was audible-while music, on the
other hand, benefiting from the development of a comprehensive
system of notation, was now more than audible-it was visible.
C. The Fourteenth & Fifteenth Centuries: Validity and
Normativity in the Structure of Statutes
1. The Form of Introduction
We are on the threshold of normativity, but normative laws assume
that most people obey the law. We are therefore, more accurately,
on the threshold of a jurisprudential question: subjected now to the
gaze of the law, on what grounds were people expected to obey it?
66. Id. at ch. 1.
67. Articuli Super Cartas, 28 Edw. I, chs. 1,17 (1300) (Eng.); De Tallagio non Concedendo,
34 Edw. I, ch. 6 (1306) (Eng.); see also, 7 Edw. I, Stat. 1 (1278) (Eng.): "We command you, that
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In rough outline, three broad answers might be given. Nineteenth-
century British and American positivists, of whom John Austin is the
best known, characterized all laws as commands issued by a political
superior. Austin's position is more subtle than is commonly supposed.
Contrary to the interpretation placed upon his work by some later
writers, Austin does not dismiss the relevance of morality to law.'
For Austin, however, there can be no law without a sanction, and it
is from the threat of punishment that our duty to obey arises: "Being
liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you signify
... I lie under a duty to obey it."'69 For Austin, and for Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Hans Kelsen among later writers, legal
obligation is rooted in coercion.70
This position has been attacked on a variety of grounds. For
instance, natural law theory may be taken to imply that moral
conclusions, no less than scientific ones, can be objectively deduced
from first principles, whether these first principles are divinely
ordained or (since the Enlightenment) rationally determined. If, as
the contemporary theorist of natural law, John Finnis, argues in
Natural Law and Natural Rights, it is possible to reason from largely
uncontentious first principles to the solution of moral problems, then
each of us has the capacity to discover for ourselves those laws that
are morally justifiable and those that are not.71 Such an approach
suggests that we are not required, morally or legally, to obey a law
which by such a process of objective reasoning we discover to be
"immoral." Reason imposes a greater claim upon us than power.
72
68. See in particular ROBERT N. MOLES, DEFINmON AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY (1987),
which attempts a resurrection of the work of John Austin, especially from Hart's interpretation
of him in HART, supra note 2, chs. 2-4.
69. Admittedly, he argues that "where there is the smallest chance of incurring the smallest
evil, the expression of a wish amounts to a command" (emphasis added). This might suggest
that for Austin, coercion is an analytical and not a sociological necessity of the legal system. In
considering the problem that arises when one's understanding of the obligations of "divine law"
contradicts the commands of positive law, however, Austin concludes that our duty is to obey
whichever provides the greater sanction: "if human commands conflict with the Divine Law, we
ought to disobey the command which is enforced by the less powerful sanction." The dictates
of morality are of no consequence. The duty to obey any law--divine or positive-arises from
the power that affirms it; the greater the power, the greater the duty, for "it is our interest to
choose the smaller and more uncertain evil." AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 90-91, 215. Further
evidence for Austin's understanding of law as a system of power relations can be found in id
at Lecture I.
70. Id. at 90-93; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897);
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans., 1961). See also
the discussion of Austin in ROGER B.M. COTrERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE 59-67
(1989).
71. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 34-125 (1980); see also Michael
S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).
72. Finnis tries to subvert this implication, arguing that the obligation to obey the law is itself
a "relatively weighty" moral obligation: "Such an ambitious attempt as the law's can only
succeed in creating and maintaining order, and a fair order, inasmuch as individuals drastically
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Somewhere between Austin's coercive legal order and the specter
of untrammeled freedom evoked by the natural law tradition, modem
positivists like H. L. A. Hart have sought to ground legal obligation
in the authority of legal texts. According to Hart, the fact that a law
exists provides those subject to it with a compelling reason for
compliance. In this regard, Hart emphasizes the existence of "rules
of recognition," which determine the validity of primary rules of
obligation. A statute, for example, duly passed by Parliament, is legal
and authoritative, and thereby provides citizens with an adequate
reason for following the course of action prescribed in it.' On this
analysis, it is neither truth nor power that grounds obedience to the
law, but the validity of its social sources. Joseph Raz argues even
more emphatically for a "sources thesis," arguing that the legitimacy
of the formal "sources" of a law, such as a properly enacted statute
or an authoritative judicial interpretation, establishes a separate
reason to obey the law, apart from the justice of its contents.74 This
attitude of respect does characterize the approach of many people to
the legal system in which they live; they justify a law not because of
its reasonableness but because of the "systemic validity" of the
process by which laws are established.5
Although debate may surround the merits of a particular piece of
legislation (both before and after its enactment), the modem statute,
restrict the occasions on which they trade off their legal obligations against their... conceptions
of social good." FIN S, supra note 71, at 319. At best we can say that this argument stems
from his own desire to safeguard the "Rule of Law" (quaintly capitalized), and from his
assumption that the legal system basically does nothing more contentious than solve "com-
munities' co-ordination problems"--such as which side of the road to drive on. This
complacency is reflected in his assumption that in "normal times... the legal system is by and
large just." Id. at 270-74, 357. Even in his own terms, however, the mere existence of the legal
system cannot deny us our freedom to examine whether the laws under which we live are "by
and large just," for the "relatively weighty" moral obligation he proposes is dependent upon that
premise. At least to this extent and arguably far beyond it, a theory of natural law expects
citizens to inquire into not only what the law is, but also what justifications support it.
73. HART, supra note 2, at 99-120.
74. AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 5, at 47-50.
75. Id. at 150-53, 233-61; see also Authority, Law and Morality, supra note 5. Certainly, Raz
does attempt to place a further limit on this argument. He argues that "[n]o blind obedience
to authority is here implied.... This brings into play the dependent reasons, for only if the
authority's compliance with them is likely to be better than that of its subjects is its claim to
legitimacy justified." AUTHOprTY OF LAw, supra note 5, at 299. The extent of this caveat is
unclear. If we are to believe the statements of lawmakers, they are invariably in a better
position than the rest of us to weigh conflicting arguments concerning legal questions. In
practice, however, one might doubt whether this is true. Moreover, Raz also insists that "all
authoritative directives should be based, among other factors, on reasons which apply to the
subjects of those directives." Id. Again, it does not take more than a wholesome and average
cynicism to argue that many laws have been passed in which the actual reasons for enactment
do not bear much relation to the reasons put forward. Are we to investigate the machinations
behind every bill before pronouncing upon its authority? This suggests a kind of Kantian
approach in which not the justice of the law itself, but the motivations of the lawmaker would
be decisive. One doubts whether this was Raz's intent.
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on its face, presents no justification for the law but the law itself. For
example, the preamble of modem statutes has become almost
irrelevant. This approach supports Raz's thesis: the fact that a piece
of legislation has been passed in accordance with correct procedure
provides us with reason enough to obey it.
Let us return to the radically different gaze of the second Statute of
Westminster. What is the source of its normative force? Why were
people expected to obey it, particularly when it claimed to change the
existing normative rule? The answer is not simple. Many of its
chapters follow a two-step process. First, the injustice of the present
law is explicitly acknowledged: the law "seemed very hard," "was very
hard," "was most hard," and so on. The same phrase is used in other
statutes dating from this period.76 "Hard" is a tactile word, posses-
sing a physicality that contrasts starkly with words relating to more
abstract senses such as sight. We see from afar, but we only ex-
perience hardness by direct contact, the felt and brute reality of a
resisting object.77 A "hard" law, therefore, is a law whose injustice
is actually felt and not merely observed. The awareness of the legal
system as something embedded in and touching the whole community
thus continued to grow. Indeed, to speak of the "gaze" of the law is
no longer entirely adequate. "Gaze" is a dispassionate, visual word;
here, the legal system is starting not only to see a broader role for
itself, but to feel it, too.
Second, the hardness of the present law having been established,
the chapters of the second Statute of Westminster propose solutions
and improvements with a consistent declaration that this is to be the
law "from henceforth" (de cetero in Latin). 8 In contrast to those
statutes of Henry III which studiously preserved the law as it had
been in his grandfather's day, such an approach is future-oriented and
corrective. To elicit conformity to the changes that are made,
however, this legislation relies neither on the Crown's coercive power
nor on the validity attaching to the formal procedures for the statute's
enactment. Instead, a reason is given to accept the new law-namely,
that the previous law was "very hard."
Indeed, the structure of these chapters is that of an ar-
gument--current law, criticism, solution-and not a declaration. The
76. 13 Edw. I, Stat. 1, cbs. 1, 3, 9 (1285) (Eng.) (original in Latin). Similarly but less
judgmentally, several provisions simply present the law "hitherto": "hitherto it bath been used
in the Realm," "by the law and custom of the Realm hitherto," etc. Il at chs. 5, 6; see also id.
at chs. 9, 14. For another example, see Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I (1290) (Eng.).
77. See Howes, supra note 12. C.S. Peirce's understanding of "thirdness," within the
tripartite division of his semiotics, possesses something of the same physical undeniability.
78. Statute of Westminster, the 2nd, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 1, as in chs. 7, 10, 18, 19, 23 (thrice),
24, 26, 28-30, 40, 45-47 (1285) (Eng.).
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normativity of this law stems not from its authority or power but from
its appeal to justice and reason. The lengthy and emotive introduc-
tions to the first Statute de Marlberge and the Statute of Westminster
provide further evidence for this suggestion. The more weighty a
statute's ambitions were, the more imposing was the flourish of jus-
tification which had to accompany it. The authors of these normative
provisions evidently took an approach akin to natural law theory, for
obedience and respect were sought here through the strength of moral
reasoning present in the legislation itself
79
During the thirteenth century, the marshaling of reasons ran
through the substantive provisions of statutes like a commentary,
melismatic as any organa, suggesting that the distinction between law,
politics, and history remained extremely hazy. Indeed, one way of
understanding this early statutory form is to see it as a document that,
in the absence of other kinds of authoritative records, combined both
substantive law and parliamentary debate-reasons and consequences.
The style of statutes continued to change throughout the century,
however, gradually shifting from an emphasis on the reasons behind
the law to an emphasis on the validating procedures surrounding its
enactment. If we jump forward to the second half of the fourteenth
century (by which time the use of law French in statutes was
uniform), a change was already apparent. The introductory reasons
for enactment were now less specific than those we observed in the
Statute de Marlberge and the Statute of Westminster, and increasingly
they were confined to a structurally discrete part of the statute which
we now recognize as a form of introduction. A statute passed in 1362
begins, "To the Honour and Pleasure of God, and Amendment of the
outrageous Grievances and Oppressions done to the People, and in
Relief of their Estate."'  A rhetorical flourish like this could hardly
have served as a reason justifying any particular part of the statute,
which contained a number of unrelated substantive provisions.
In the following years, the introduction became ever more formal,
referring to the way in which the statute was passed rather than to its
content or purposes.8' The formal procedure of the statute's
79. Much the same argument is made by Plucknett in evaluating judicial interpretation of
both the common law and statutes in the reigns of the first three Edwards; judges' willingness
to ignore or modify statutes also reflected an assumption that the enacted law was subject to
reason and the ius naturale. PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION, supra note
7 at 25, 49-81; see also H.D. Hazeltine, Preface to PLUcKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at xxiii.
80. 36 Edw. III (1362) (Eng.).
81. 1 Rich. II (1377) (Eng.) is typical and by no means the first of this kind:
Know thou, that to the Honour of God and Reverence of Holy Church, for to nourish
Peace, Unity, and Concord in all the parts within our Realm of England... with the
Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, and Barons of this our Realm, at the Instance and
1995] 347
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enactment was becoming more important than the reasons for
enactment. By 1407, the form of introduction had become almost
standardized, invariably referring to certain definite features, such as
the date of the Parliament, the presence and concurrence of both
Houses of Parliament, and the will of the Crown:
Because that divers Complaints have been made.., in the Par-
liament holden at Gloucester... the same our Lord the King,
willing to remedy the said Complaints, with the Advice and
Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the Instance
and Request of the said Commons, hath caused to be ordained
and established divers Ordinances and Statutes .... 82
By the middle of the fifteenth century all traces of rhetorical jus-
tification had vanished, and the introduction had become purely
formal.'
We have traced the metamorphosis of the introduction as a
structural item from a means of establishing the reasons for the
enactment of a statute, to a means of establishing its validity or
procedural legitimacy. Each chapter-the substantive units into which
a statute is divided-still contained some explanation of the purpose
of its enactment, and at times this explanation is grandiloquent, as in
this example dating from 1483: "The King remembering how the
commons of this his Realm, by new and unlawful Invention, and
inordinate Covetise, against the law of this Realm, hath been put to
great Thraldom and importable Charges and Exactions ... to their
almost utter destruction ... ."I Nonetheless, the general introduc-
tion to statutes had developed a significant and novel character. It
now reflected the growing importance of procedure in establishing the
authoritative nature of the law, suggesting the slow triumph of
something like Raz's "sources thesis" in the minds of law-
makers-that people ought to obey the law because of who issued it,
rather than why it was issued.
especial Request of the Commons of our Realm aforesaid, assembled at our Parliament.
Id.
82. 9 Hen. IV (1407) (Eng.).
83. 3 Hen. VII, ch. 1 1487 (Eng.) is typical:
The King our sovereign Lord Henry .... at his Parliament holden at Westminster the Ninth
Day of November, in the Third Year of his Reign, to the worship of God and Holy
Church, and for the common Weal of this his Realm, by the Advice of his Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and the Commons in the present Parliament assembled, and by Authority
of the same Parliament, hath ordained and established certain Statutes and Ordinances, in
Manner and Form as hereafter ensueth.
Id.
84. 1 Rich. III, ch. 2 (1483) (Eng.).
348
32
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss2/3
Manderson
2. The Act of Parliament
The increase of royal power and the establishment of a consistent
legislative procedure reflected the increasing importance of procedural
validity in grounding normativity. At the same time, we have seen
how the legislative gaze slowly expanded to encompass the commons,
and we have noted that law's purpose began to change from
declaratory to imperative, from "is" to "ought." I have described this
as a fundamental change in who was "seen" by the powerful, and in
what way, but it also represented a profound change in the elite's
view of the purpose and capacity of law itself
Edward IV's first statute was enacted in 1461, in the midst of civil
war. It is not surprising, then, to find therein a particularly detailed
justification of Edward's claim to the Crown as against his rivals, dead
and alive. The incorporations, authorizations, and statutes of the
"late pretensed Kings," "late in Deed and not in Right, Kings of
England" are specifically confirmed. 5 But there is a subtler change
here of more lasting significance. The first chapter of this statute
confirms not only the "Judicial Acts" of his predecessors, but also
their "acts and ordinances." The statute refers at several other points
to "this Act" and "other Acts." Indeed, within a few years, each
chapter would come to be called "An Act" to effect a particular pur-
pose.86
What does this mean? I am immediately reminded of the "Acts of
the Apostles," but despite the apparent similarity, the two uses of the
word are quite distinct. An "act" is "a thing done; a deed, a perfor-
mance," 87 and the apostles' "acts" were clearly deeds or things done.
The New Testament text which we call "Acts" is therefore primarily
a description of those acts or activities. In other words, the words of
the book we call "Acts" record "acts" done elsewhere.
An "Act of Parliament" is very different. Where, one might ask,
is the "act" to which this "Act" refers? Undoubtedly, a judgment or
a court's decision is an "act" in the literal sense for it has concrete
85. 1 Edw. IV, ch. 1 (1461) (Eng.).
86. Id. at xvii, xii, xxii, xxiv. Runnington, supra note 1, refers to 3 Edw. IV, ch. 2 (1263)
(Eng.) as the first statute to use the word "Act" in its title, but this title and others of this period
were added during the reign of Henry VIII, by which time the use of the word "Act" to describe
a chapter of a statute was indeed conventional. Although less immediately apparent, 1 Edw. IV,
ch. 1 is an earlier and genuine reference to "Act" in this sense.
It is not the earliest reference: 29 Hen. VI, ch. 2 (1450) (Eng.) and 33 Hen. VI, ch. 2 (1454)
(Eng.) both say "this Act"; but 1 Edw. IV, ch. 1 (1461) (Eng.) uses the phrase more clearly and
frequently. In particular, while the introductory portion of these earlier statutes declare that
"Our Sovereign Lord King... hath ordained and established divers Ordinances and Statutes,"
the 1461 statute uses the phrase "acts and ordinances." I&. (italics added). This is the significant
change.
87. 1 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICIONARY 91 (1st ed. 1933).
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and immediate effects. A chapter of a statute is to a certain extent
an "act" also. The act of writing the law, and of arguing over the
words to be written, is a deed or thing done. Only in this sense,
however, is it either an "act" itself or a record of the actions of
others. The only act is the act of speaking and of writing. It could be
termed a charter, a fiat, a decree, an ordinance, a missive, a treaty, a
declaration, a communique, a proclamation, a writ. What after all
does "writ" mean, but "that which is written"? All these words
convey the sense in which, above all (and unlike the acts of the
Apostles), statutes are words on paper. Even the word "statute"
derives from the Latin "to stand" and suggests a concrete entity of
words. A statute "stands written. '
But the use of the word "Act" to refer to a statute or part
thereof-a technical meaning which is now commonplace-is
confusing and ambiguous. The physical "act" or "deed done" is
completed once the law is assented to. (To ease the confusion, I will
use a capital "A" when using the word "act" in this legislative sense.)
The "act of Parliament" is over with at the moment of enactment. In
contrast, to enshrine an enactment as "An Act" implies something
present and ongoing. This is enlightening, for it suggests that the
statute, although written down, does not just "stand" still. In some
way it continues to "act." The word "Act" thus translates the statute
from marks on paper into energy which continues to operate in the
world. It illustrates a world-view in which statutes came gradually to
be seen not only as statements or historical records of events, but as
acts with effects of their own, like the expanding ripples of a rock
thrown into a pond. Additionally, in contrast to the earlier understan-
ding of legislation as a declaratory instrument-a statutum whose
function is to "stand written"-an "act" is active. It implies vigorous
engagement with the world, a desire to intrude and change. An Act
is not just an inert thing but is a way of modifying the world; it is a
vector with direction and velocity.
I do not mean to suggest that I agree with this world-view; it
demonstrates a rather facile and il-conceived faith in the law's ability
to remake the world in its own image. I do, however, contend that
the use of the word "Act" signifies this understanding of law, now
orthodox. Statutes that specify a time for their entry into force are,
as I noted, the earliest examples of such an understanding, but it was
only later that the Act became disembodied from its physical origins
as a document and began to take on a life of its own. The steady
88. See HANs-GEORG GADAMER, On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth, in
THE RELEVANCE OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER ESSAYS 110 (R. Bernasconi ed. & N. Walker
trans., 1986).
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expansion in the number, size, and detail of laws, from the fifteenth
century until the present day, reflects the same assumption that to
pass a law is to set something in motion. What else can an Act do,
Edward's court may have thought, but act?
The Act therefore symbolizes the law's vigor and its determination
to interact with the world of things. This is radically different from
the passive understanding of law we have largely encountered
hitherto. We have not yet, however, reached a particularly sophis-
ticated understanding of the nature of the statute, for there is a sense
in which the novel use of the word "Act" which I have been
explaining carries the implication that a miraculous transformation
will somehow take place, as if the mere proclamation of the law can
somehow by itself set in motion the new reality it proposes. There is
here a faith in some sort of magical osmosis between word and world.
Such naivet6 stems from an inadequate appreciation of the
complexities of the "real world." In the fifteenth century, this
inadequacy reflected a still-limited gaze, for the court's understanding
of "the People" was far from sophisticated. Lawmakers' inability to
foresee creatively the process by which the intentions behind a statute
could be realized, the human steps of application and enforcement
required, and the resistance that might be faced from people with
opposing values and practices may have led them to assume that the
passing of an Act alone did the job. Although the King's gaze now
fell upon the people, it did not enter into their lives. It did not ade-
quately appreciate how extraneous and partial a paper law can
sometimes look to those expected to reconfigure their world in its
light. Empathy, the ability to gaze as if through other's eyes-to see
the law as it looks to those subject to it-is a skill that was still largely
absent.
Nor, of course, is it notably present in the twentieth century.
Indeed, the moral entrepreneurs of our own time have often insisted
upon the legal prohibition of behavior, frequently denying the reality
of how people, regardless of the law, choose to live their lives. This
insistence suggests an overweening faith in the importance of law,
grounded in the instrumentalist fallacies and aesthetic failings that we
first begin to notice during the statutes' formative period.
Although flawed, the idea of the "Act" is nevertheless important
-you cannot readily believe in the normative power of law unless
you assume that laws act in the world. The change from "statute" to
"Act" therefore represents a crucial milestone in the trend toward
normativity begun earlier. The structure of written law also reflects
this trend toward greater normativity. The earliest statutes were, as
we have seen, narrations of political events. The statutum, a historical
record of the decisions of a particular session of Parliament, was the
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fundamental legislative unit, divided into "chapters" merely for the
sake of clarity and convenience. By the fifteenth century, a change
was underway. Statutes had more chapters than ever before, many
of which were themselves subdivided into several articles or sections.
Statutes no longer had titles; chapters soon gained them. At the same
time, as we have seen, the introduction of the statute was becoming
more formal and less important. By the time of Henry VIII, it had
disappeared altogether and had been replaced by a similar formula at
the beginning of each chapter.89 The chapter is now known as an
"Act" of Parliament. The statute is merely an omnibus of these Acts,
bound together at the end of the regnal year. We witness here the
demise of the statute as the fundamental unit of legislative structure
and its replacement by the chapter.
These structural changes reflect a conceptual change, for while
statutes were distinguished chronologically, each chapter can be distin-
guished by its purpose. Why was it now seen as necessary to divide
chapters into sections? Partly because of the details of control with
which each law was increasingly concerned, but also because the
chapter is a purposive unit. The sections all "belong" within a
particular chapter because they are all steps designed to facilitate the
same purpose. Lawmaking had therefore changed from a record of
past events (stated in the statute) to an act of present will (captured
by the chapter). Law was seen increasingly as purposive-each Act
a discrete normative decision aimed at effecting a specified end. We
know where this progress eventually leads. In the twentieth century,
the word "statute" has lost its original meaning as a collection of
legislation from a particular regnal year and is treated as synonymous
with "Act" and (more rarely) "chapter."'  Each "statute,"
understood in this sense, is designed to change the law in a particular
way; it frequently includes hundreds of sections, all of which share, at
least to some extent, a common purpose. Now, the statute is no
longer a history at all, but rather the expression of an idea, normative
and purposive throughout.
89. The first statute not to have a form of introduction was 7 Hen. VII (1491) (Eng.), but
this was a plague year and some irregularity of form was only to be expected. In 1492, the
introduction reappears and remains until 1509.
90. While the argument as to the meaning of the changing arrangement of statutes and Acts
holds, it must be noted that there is some evidence that in the earlier period, chapters were
sometimes in fact called statutes themselves--the last chapter of the Statute of Westminster the
2nd, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 1 (1285) (Eng.), is one example, referring to "omnia predicta statuta."
Inconsistency of terminology is hardly surprising at this time, but I do not believe this
undermines the conceptual and structural points I am making as to the way in which the
organizing principles of legislation changed. See PLUcKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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We have, in fact, rung down the curtain on the medieval world and
entered the Renaissance, an age of unbounded confidence in man's
ability to change the world by an act of will. In fifteenth-century
music, composers such as Ockeghem and, in England, Pycard and
Byttering, began to refine the "canon," a musical form which later
reached its apotheosis in the fugue.91 A canon, however, is more
rule-based in nature: the musical statement of one part is copied by
other voices, either exactly or in accordance with predetermined
principles of transformation. It is the realization of a musical law, in
truth as well as in etymology. Like an Act, a canon continues to
enforce its will upon the world. It is a composition subjected to the
governance of principles and themes enacted in advance, and with
whose terms composer and performer alike must obediently comply.
There is, for example, in the formidable Gloria of Pycard, a five-part
double canon, a heightened clarity of line and regulation of the form
of musical expression- just as we have seen in the Acts of the period
a heightened clarity of purpose and regulation of the form of legal
expression.
3. Legal Subjects
On the Continent and particularly in England, the fifteenth century
is above all notable for the triumph of harmony as a guiding aesthetic
principle. On the one hand, musical harmony became enriched,
principally by the declining use of parallel fifths and the increased use
of thirds and sixths, previously considered "imperfect intervals" of
little harmonic value.' The early fifteenth-century manuscripts
collected in the Old Hall collection mark with particular prominence
this cultural development.93
Simultaneous with this thickening in harmonic texture, the con-
sonance of all melodic lines became a crucial task of composition. In
fifteenth-century polyphonic music, then, each note must be studied
and integrated, not only in relation to its own line, but also in relation
to all the other notes being sung by different parts at the same time.
The compositional gaze is directed vertically as well as horizontally,
toward deepening the control exercised over harmony as well as
toward the expansion of melodic range. The result is that the sound
of Western music changed markedly, from spacious and hollow, to
91. HARRISON, supra note 9, at 236-40.
92. Undoubtedly, English compositional style had long used these harmonies far more than
had its European counterpart.
93. The "faburden" (faux Bourdon), basically an ornamented part in parallel sixths to the
cantus firmus, became an almost routine aspect of three-part writing in fifteenth-century
England. It was one of the foundations of musical education at that time. HARRISON, supra
note 9, at 247-49; LEFERTS, supra note 9, at 90.
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lush and thick. From the single melodic line of plainsong, or the
relatively simple structure and sound of the earliest motets, the field
of the composer's gaze had widened vastly in all directions: melodical-
ly, rhythmically, and harmonically. There is a complexity of musical
consciousness here, accompanied by an unprecedented complexity of
musical organization and control. It is this complexity of writing and
hearing that the "motet" came to represent.
The development of statutory form likewise reflects a heightened
complexity of legal consciousness, an expansion of the depth and
breadth of gaze, and an increasing interest in the consonance and co-
ordination of the community. The idea that the purposes of the law
are to reform, to act, and to provide norms, was well established by
the fifteenth century and was applied to a much wider range of the
King's subjects and over an increasing proportion of their lives. Law
thus sought to harmonize the behavior of more citizens in ever more
intricate ways." Still, the way in which the law strove to harmonize
the conduct of the community remained limited. As England's
mercantile power grew, for example, there was a barrage of laws
controlling trade, import, and the economic conditions of the
country-Acts about coins, loans, boats, bread, and wool.95 By and
large, these Acts attempted to change the conditions of the
world-people's status, their land, their property, their trade-and
only indirectly did they attempt to influence their beliefs and desires.
While these laws affect context in which people can act and the
environment in which their attitudes are formed, they do not operate
directly on them. To put it another way, the idea that the law is
normative, that its terms control how people think and how they
choose to behave-an attitude assumed by modem criminal
law-conceives of the mind as an object which the law manipulates
almost as if it were a loaf of bread or a bushel of wheat. While this
approach had begun to be expressed, it had not yet triumphed.
Not all legislation was of this kind. We begin to notice at the same
time the emergence of "private Acts," designed to modify the legal
status and entitlements of specific individuals rather than of the public
as a whole.96 Such laws, for example, provide for the divorce or
94. For a different approach to the notion of harmony in law, see Martin Boodman, The
Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. CoMP. L 699, 700-02 (1991).
95. See, e.g., 3 Edw. IV, chs. 1-5 (Eng.); 4 Edw. IV, chs. 1-10 (Eng.); 7 Edw. IV, chs. 1-3
(Eng.); 8 Edw. IV, chs. 1-2 (Eng.). In these years, typical of the years before and after, over 80
percent of the acts are of this character. These are certainly not the first acts dealing with such
matters. See, e.g., Assisa Panis & Cervisix, 51 Hen. I1, Stat. 1 (1266) (Eng.); Statute of Money,
20 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1291) (Eng.). But in comparison with the preponderance of administrative
materials to be found in thirteenth-century statutes, there is a different emphasis here.
96. It was thought for a long time that private acts began in the reign of Richard III, but in
fact they began some years earlier, although the private acts of Richard III, and then of Henry
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pardon of particular individuals, the settlement of land disputes, and
the granting of titles to the nobility. In other words, they were a
generally welcome involvement in the dealings of named members of
the ruling class.
At first blush, this may seem to be a throwback to the thirteenth
century, but nothing could be further from the truth. Certainly the
thirteenth-century gaze focused on individuals, such as sheriffs and
bailiffs, but it saw them as "agents" carrying out the King's wishes.
Here, on the contrary, the law was acting as the agent of these in-
dividuals, facilitating their desires. Statutory law was now acting for
the interests of individuals and beyond the interests of the King. This
trend became much more pronounced in the nineteenth century, when
private Acts dealt with the incorporation of companies, provided
authority to build bridges and roads, and so on-in short, when the
statute book seems to have been nothing but an instrument of
capitalism.97
In undertaking this enabling function as early as the fifteenth
century, statutory law saw (a very limited class of) citizens as its
"subjects," whose actions were either circumscribed or facilitated by
its terms. In contrast, the law's view of them as "agents" representing
the King lay in the past, and its view of them as "objects," whose very
desire for action may be made to conform to the rules of harmony, lay
substantially in the future. This integration of each member of society
into a whole community, subject to laws which determined in advance
their attitudes toward and relationship with each other, constituted
the triumph of the harmonic principle in law.
D. The Sixteenth Century: Validity and Power
1. The Structure of the Preamble
As the Wars of the Roses entered their final stages, the language
of Acts seemed to reflect a greater consciousness of "the People" on
whose behalf each side claimed to be waging bitter war. Perhaps in
an attempt to establish popular legitimacy for his rule, the coronation
of Richard III in 1483 saw another decisive linguistic change: then and
thereafter, Acts of Parliament all were written in English. The change
from French to English was not as sudden as it might appear,
however. As early as 1362, a statute required that all cases should be
pleaded and debated in English, and, around the same time, some
VII, considerably surpass the earlier examples in quantity. See Thomns, supra note 1, at 754.
97. Although it deals with this period in United States (rather than English) law, see
MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).
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petitions to Parliament began to appear on the roll in English.98
These were precursors to the comprehensive change accomplished a
century later.
Now some trends that we observed in the preceding centuries began
to congeal. The shift from Latin to French to English, for example,
was a slow and significant one that represented an increasingly
spacious gaze and a more normative understanding of law. The
breadth of the modern legal gaze-that is, its attempt to reach and
influence everybody in the community-is directly correlated to a
heightened faith in the law as an instrument of social change, and a
heightened expectation of social conformity. We can see the triumph
of this attitude in our own day, with the emergence of "Plain
English," an -ideology of writing and style now adopted by virtually all
legislative drafters in the English-speaking world." It reflects an
attempt to make statutes more readily comprehensible, and it stems
from the belief that the law has a strongly normative effect-that is,
that the law really does provide powerful independent reasons for
action among those who (are assumed to) read and know it. "Plain
English" insists that the law will be effective, if only it is understood,
and that it can be understood only if it is readable. Behind "Plain
English" lies the assumption that the correct audience for a law is the
community as a whole, and not only the community of lawyers. It is
in this sense that it reflects the apotheosis of the modern gaze and the
antithesis of the medieval.
Another theme that we observed over the preceding centuries has
been the growing importance of the legal validity of an Act. The
argumentative style of the introduction declined, and the formal
details of, and procedure surrounding, statutes' enactment grew in
significance. By the time of Henry VII, whose accession to the throne
in 1485 put an end to the Wars of the Roses, the location of these
formalities had moved, so that every Act (i.e., chapter) itself stated,
"It is ordained, established, and enacted by the Advice of the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in the said Parliament
assembled, and by Authority of the same .... ." The
chronological statute as an important conceptual entity thus disap-
peared and had been replaced by the purposive Act. By the
98. 36 Edw. III, Stat. 1, ch. 15 (1362) (Eng.); see POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 7, at
85-86. On the "Englishing" of Latin and French statutes in Tudor times, see Graham, supra
note 1.
99. See Ian Turnbull (First Parliamentary Counsel in the Australian Office of Parliamentary
Counsel), Clear Legislative Drafting: New Approaches in Australia, 11 STATUTE L. REv. 161
(1991). It is ironic that this trend among drafters nonetheless remains arcane and customary
rather than written down and defined.
100. As in 1 Hen. VII, ch. 1 (1485) (Eng.). The original of this, and all statutes quoted in
the text hereafter, is in English.
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beginning of the reign of Henry VIII, as noted, the introduction had
disappeared altogether from the annual statutes of Parliament. All
that was left was a Preamble to each individual Act which cited both
the reasons for its enactment and the grounds of its formal validity.
The emphasis on the legal validity of laws had not yet entirely
eliminated their rhetorical character. Neither the validity of an Act
nor even the threat of coercive measures were apparently yet
sufficient to instill the habit of obedience.'' The Preamble, it is
true, was the central locus of this rhetoric, structurally distinct from
the substantive clauses of each chapter. It was, furthermore,
frequently framed with quotation marks as if it were a recital or. a
quotation. While such structural devices served to separate
"rhetorical" language from "real" law in a way that would hardly
have made sense a century earlier, the Preamble nevertheless
continued to provide reasons for the passage of the Act. Admittedly,
these reasons were becoming less and less important as the question
of formal validity took on a conclusory function."° Nonetheless, in
Tudor England, this phase had yet to be reached.
But the nature of the justifications contained in the Preamble was
also changing. The language used was generally more specific than
it had been in earlier examples, and it related not to the condition of
the kingdom in general, but to the particular mischief which the Act
was intended to remedy."3  A further difference can be found in
several of these Preambles, which are written in the form of a petition
submitted by a group seeking Parliament's help. The Act which
incorporated the Royal College of Physicians is a well-known
example."° Containing no substantive clauses, the Act is entirely
constituted of the petition it recites; it is a disembodied Preamble. An
Act of 1512 likewise quotes an earlier Act relating to pewterers and
continues with their plea:
101. See HART, supra note 2; Authority, Law and Morality, supra note 5.
102. In the present day, the Preamble, understood as a way of justifying a particular statute,
is both rare and insignificant, although some argue that the use of declaratory or hortatory text
in legislation, of which the Preamble is one species, is currently experiencing a rejuvenation. See
V. Palmer, The Style of Legislation in the United States: Narrative Norms and Constraining
Norms, AM. J. COMP. L 15 (1994).
103. 1 Hen VIII, ch. 8 (1509-10) (Eng.) is typical: "For as much as divers of King's subjects
lately have been sore hurt, troubled and some disherited by Escheators and Commissioners,
causing untrue Offices to be founded ... to the great Hurt, Trouble, and Disherison of the
King's true Subjects.. .. " See also, for examples at this time, 3 Hen. VIII, ch. 11 (1511) (Eng.),
which declares that "the Science and Cunning of Physick and Surgery ... is daily within this
Realm exercised by a great Multitude of ignorant Persons .... " or 4 Hen. VIII, ch. 2 (1512)
(Eng.): "Whereas Robberies, Murders, and Felonies daily increase more and more, and be
committed and done in more heinous and open and detestable wise than hath often been seen
in times past . ... "
104. 14 & 15 Hen. VIII, ch. 5 (1522) (Eng.); see also 3 Hen. VIII, chs. 11 & 14 (1511) (Eng.).
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Please it therefore your Grace and Wisdom, inasmuch as the said
Act is thought good and profitable, that it be ordained, enacted
and established by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, the Com-
mons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority
of the same, that the said Act may endure for ever.105
This Act and others like it are interesting for two reasons. First,
strictly speaking, they enacted nothing. The Act concludes with an
entreaty for the Parliament to act and a plea that it be so ordained,
enacted, and established, but, although we can assume as much from
its place in the statute book, the statute includes no positive statement
that Parliament acceded to the petition. By the time of Henry VIII,
then, lawmaking has to such a great extent become an activity to
satisfy others' interests, that a mere statement of an interest group's
petition seems to imply Parliament's acquiescence. The development
of the legislative petition suggests the extent to which the law had
become facilitative, and corporations and organizations its subjects.
Second, although the recital of a petition demonstrates that the
reasons for a law were still important sources of its power, a subtle
change here paradoxically points to the growing importance of law's
formal validity. It is instructive to compare these petitions with the
early statute on bastardy, which recorded the bishops' "petition" to
the Lords."c6 In that case, the fact that the petition was recorded on
the statute roll did not alter Parliament's inactivity, although it is true
that, in that case, the statute also noted the Lords' opposition to the
petition. By the sixteenth century, however, things had obviously
changed. For what does it mean that the mere recording of the
petition apparently sufficed to create law? It means that everything
that appears in the statute book is taken to be "law." Raz, on the
other hand, argues that a law's authority derives from the validity of
the parliamentary process, that the statute itself possesses only a kind
of evidential validity.1" Just because a petition is placed on the roll,
therefore, does not mean, according to Raz, that it has gone through
the parliamentary procedure which entities it to validity.
This was clearly not the understanding here. The statute book is,
in a semiotic sense, "iconic" of law's validity."°8 A religious icon is
105. 4 Hen. VIII, ch. 7 (1512) (Eng.) (referring to 19 Hen. VII, ch. 6 (1503) (Eng.)). A
similar approach in a different circumstance is taken in the case of Richard Strode, 4 Hen. VIII,
ch. 8 (1512) (Eng.); see also the petition permitting the marriages of the six clerks of the High
Court of Chancery, 14 & 15 Hen. VIII, ch. 8 (1522) (Eng.).
106. 20 Hen. III, ch. 9 (1235) (Eng.). See supra text accompanying footnotes 41 and 42
infra.
107. See AUTHORnTY OF LAW, supra note 5.
108. Goodrich contends that statutes were sacred icons, symbols of authority, and not
practical documents in the period after the Norman conquest. But I have argued elsewhere in
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not only a "symbol" or image of a sacred person, but a sacred object
in itself. In this case, the statute is not merely a symbol of law's
legitimacy, but itself renders authoritative and valid everything
contained within it. The mere presence of a petition in the statute
book miraculously seems to entitle it to be interpreted as
law-because of the iconic power of the book in which it is set down.
These words are legal icons that convey value and demand obedience
simply by their presence on the page. It is this kind of validity of
which we begin to catch a glimpse in the petitions of the sixteenth
century.
2. Penalties and Power
The changing nature of the preamble in Tudor England
demonstrates the growing importance of legal validity as the grounds
of legal obedience. At the same time, we see the growth of coercion
as a means of ensuring obedience. In marked contrast to the position
of even fifty years earlier, the statutes of Henry VII display an
Austinian consciousness of the importance of penalties in giving
people a reason to obey the law. Each Tudor Act typically describes
an offense and provides a specific penalty for each offense. No longer
was the penalty just "a grievous fine" or "as the trespass requires,"
but, for example, 6s/8d for the first offense, 13s/4d for the second
offense, and 20 shillings for each subsequent offense. 9 A system
of coercion operated here, enforcing obedience.
We have already noted that this coercive specificity implies a
stronger appreciation of legal normativity and a more comprehensive
"gaze." As I have suggested, this can be characterized as the
"objectification" of community members, the assumption that their
behavior and beliefs can be molded by legislative intervention. There
is no inconsistency here with the "subjectification" of law which I
described above. Both were gaining strength in the minds of law-
makers, although not at the same rate. The statutes of the sixteenth
century treated citizens more as legal subjects than as objects; but in
comparison with earlier centuries, both these approaches had gained
ground. So, too, in our own time, law is seen as both the ultimate
architect, redesigning the world according to its own blueprint, and as
the ultimate evangelist, transforming our hearts and minds directly.
If the latter, objectifying function of law is now more prominent, as
this paper that, in relation to statutes anyway, this is not so. The power of the statute as icon
arises along with normativity and not prior to it. See Goodrich, Literacy, supra note 24.
109. 11 Hen. VII, ch. 4 (1495) (Eng.). Of the 27 chapters of this statute, 14 establish
offenses for which 15 penalties are detailed. Only in two cases, chapters 11 & 19, is no penalty
set, although the penalty for the infringement of chapter 7, concerning riots, is said to be "such
a sum of money as shall seem meet."
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was the former in the sixteenth century, it is not that our faith in legal
architecture is waning--only that our belief in legal evangelism is
particularly strong.
3. The Gaze of the Preamble
The legal system was doing two things here: recognizing that laws
will be transgressed and standardizing punishments. An awareness of
the power of law was accompanied by an awareness that law needed
power if it was to be realized. This represented a more sophisticated
imagination in which the law was conceived as it actually existed or
had come to pass. It had ceased to be a floating abstraction. We can
trace this developing understanding of the relationship of the law to
the world in the changing formula of the Preamble. In the days of
Henry VI, the following phraseology is typical: "The King, by the
Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the
Commons of this Realm of England, being in the said Parliament, and
by Authority of the same Parliament, hath ordained ... ." The
words "hath ordained" are important, for they place the King's will
firmly in the past tense. The statute was thus, as we have seen in
other contexts, a historical record of an action (the King's decision)
which was over and done with. There was no perception that the
statute continued to act in the world.
Soon after, however, we enter an ambiguous period in which the
past and present merge. Phrases of the form "it is ordained and
established," or "it is enacted, ordained, and established," ' al-
though carrying something of the past with them, are nevertheless in
the present tense. As with the word "Act" itself, which first appears
around this time, there is the implication that the mere description of
the King's will (in the past) is by itself enough to change the present.
"It is enacted" and "it is established" mean "it is done." Likewise,
these phrases are written in the passive voice. There is, therefore, no
sense of agency. The King's will "is enacted," somehow, by itself.
The use of the passive voice leaves unexplained the process by which
the statute is in fact to be established.
At the same time we begin to find examples securely wedded to the
present: "The King... doth ordain, enact, and establish," says one
Act of 1483; "the King ordaineth," says another from 1485.112 Now
this appears to be a statement of fact relating to the mind of the
King-he ordains this or that to be so. The use of the active voice
adds to this impression; it is not just "ordained," the King ordains it.
110. 27 Hen. VI (1449) (Eng.).
111. 28 Hen. VI (1450) (Eng.), 1 Hen. VII (1485-86) (Eng.).
112. 22 Edw. IV, ch. 7 (1483) (Eng.); 1 Hen. VII, ch. 7 (1485-86) (Eng.).
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This is an expression of the King's will, then, but still it reveals no
awareness of how that will is made effective. The old style "it is
enacted" implies that the world obeys the abstract word and is akin
to the faith revealed in the word "Act." "The King ordains,"
although identifying the person whose intent is at stake, says nothing
about how the world responds. On this reading the statute is a
document that records a present intention but ignores how that
intention is to be carried out.
This ambiguity between past and present soon dissipated. A
petition dating from 1495 began, "Be it ordained and enacted by your
Highness .... " The words have the character of a wish and a
request for someone ("your Highness") to act and for something to
be done in the future. "Be it enacted" means "let it be enacted."
This form became standard in all Acts and not merely in petitions.
The substantive clauses of Acts begin, "Be it also enacted," "Be it
ordained," "Wherefore be it enacted," "Be it therefore enacted,
ordained, and established." By 1523, all Acts simply and uniformly
declare, "Be it enacted. 11 4 Virtually unmodified, this form has
come down to the present day. But what imagery does this phrase
conjure up? Does it not still sound like a request-and if so, to
whom is it addressed? Let it be enacted by whom? There is a clear
image of command here. The King on his throne pronounces, "Be it
enacted," and orders someone to satisfy his wishes.
This is no longer a mere floating abstraction. The phrase "be it
therefore enacted" is a command instructing others to act to fulfill the
will expressed. The phrase suggests an awareness that it is only by
this consequent action that the King's vision can be realized, a
recognition that laws must be enacted by future action. We have
moved from will to action, and from the present to the future tense.
We have also moved from a gaze that looks at the world to one that
enters physically into it-applying, enforcing, punishing. An effort is
being made to transform the world not just by relying on the sheer
magic of words, but by muddy practice. This gaze is decidedly
modem in outlook. After centuries of intellectual struggle and a
gradually changing perception, it leaves the way open to the detailed
legal control, subjectification, and objectification which we now take
for granted. This change is idealized in Hans-George Gadamer's
discussion of legal hermeneutics, in which he argues that law ought to
113. 11 Hen. VII, ch. 12 (1495) (Eng.).
114. 11 Hen. VII, chs. 4, 12, 14, 15 (1495) (Eng.). "Be it therefore enacted, ordained, and
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be interpreted "so ... that the legal order fully penetrates
reality, 11 5 but in practice this consummation does not always appear
to have been so desirable.
A gradual increase in the detail of control and depth of gaze has
marked the history of statutory form from the Magna Carta to the
Tudors. The development of musical form followed a similar
trajectory. In Renaissance music, there is a consciousness of effect
and an attempt to use music as a species of communication quite
unlike the inward rapture of earlier times. The use of musical word-
painting typifies this communicative spirit. The Pie Jesu or Agnus Dei
of the Mass writers of the sixteenth century conveys the idea of mercy
by strictly musical as well as linguistic means, utilizing at last the full
normative power of the medium. This exploration of normative
potential came somewhat later to English music; but even in the
compositions of John Taverner or Robert Fayrfaxe, and still more so
in the motets of Thomas Tallis (1505-85), there is a rhythmic variety,
a differentiation of mood depending on the meaning of the text being
set, and a focus on syllabic clarity in the vocalization of its words, all
of which provide a stark contrast to the approach of the ancients.
11 6
Medieval music, like medieval legislation, existed in its own private
space; in the Renaissance, there is a newfound and vivid engagement
with the community-a belief that music itself, like the law, can enact
and ordain changes in the minds of those who listen.
This expanded musical gaze and function influenced the composer's
understanding of the resources at his disposal, too. Modern notation,
effectively stabilized around 1400 in England as on the Continent,
allowed an infinite subdivision of the beat, and therefore the expres-
sion of an infinite density and complexity of rhythm. At the same
time, the tonal as well as the rhythmic range of the individual voice
was expanding, so that the bass, for example, which had rarely sung
below a C, was now pushed down to an F In England, long in the
forefront of broadening the vocal range used in composition, between
1400 and 1500 the compass of polyphonic settings grew from about
two octaves (from the highest note of a setting to the lowest) to three,
while the range of an individual part, in the compositions of John Cuk
or Walter Frye, for example, now typically became a tenth or an
eleventh and on occasion a sixteenth. 7
115. HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, quoted in GOODRICH, LEGAL
DISCOURSE, supra note 24, at 160.
116. HARRISON, supra note 9 at 257-63.
117. HARRISON, supra note 9 at 261-63 (discussing Masses by Cuk and Frye); LEFFERrS,
supra note 9 at 15; WILSoN, supra note 9 at 284.
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The changes that took place here were not merely technical, but
conceptual. We see in the remarkable and prolific motets of Thomas
Tallis an awareness not simply of abstract lines, but of voices, each
with their own range and character."' Consider the note as Tallis
must have considered it. It has a temporal dimension, harmonic
implications, and timbral character; it is attached to a word, to
emotions, and to meaning as never before. Realms of opportunity
previously unimagined presented themselves to the Tldor and
Elizabethan ear. It was an aural gaze (if we can call it such a thing)
that offered a vast expansion in the means, aspects, and functions of
musical control. How far removed in depth and complexity is Tallis's
magisterial forty-part motet, Spem in alium, from the simple two-part
organum from which it grew. Above all, there is a difference of
sonority and feeling. The beauty of the music of the Middle Ages lay
in its space, its parallel movement, the simplicity and stark perfection
of its harmonies, and the constancy of its rhythm. By the Renais-
sance, these very factors had become undesirable and even ugly. We
had witnessed a profound shift in perspective and in value, not
primarily technological or administrative, but aesthetic.
III. MOTETS AND LrrrLE WORDS
There is something ironic in focusing so intently on the
interpretation of early statutes when until the end of the fourteenth
century, the judiciary did not even see statutory interpretation as an
appropriate legal function. Indeed, in 1336, one statute concluded by
demanding that the "aforesaid ordinances and statutes" should be
kept "without addition, or fraud, by covin, evasion, art, or
contrivance, or by the interpretation of the words." Statutory
interpretation was a species of fraud. 9
Yet the aesthetics of statutory interpretation has proven to be a
vein rich in the ore of insight. Surveying 300 years of English statutes
beginning with the Magna Carta, I have traced changes in the
conceptualization of law as a normative order. Modem theories of
validity (elaborated by Raz), power (emphasized in the writings of
Austin), and reason (associated with natural law theory) may all be
advanced to explain why people accept an obligation to obey the law.
As I have noted, all these ideas have changed, developed, and
intermingled. Despite these interconnections, the relative importance
of various elements has changed over time. We have seen the relative
118. See GROUT, supra note 9 at 182-221.
119. 10 Edw. III, Stat. 3 (1336) (Eng.); PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND TmEIR
INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 164-67.
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decline in the role of reason and rhetoric in legal justification, its
steady replacement by notions of formal validity, and the gradual rise,
too, in the value placed on legal coercion. We have also seen the role
of legislation change from that of a document recording the past to
that of a set of instructions for purposive future action, and its tone
change accordingly from descriptive to prescriptive. The shift from
the use of the word "statute" to the word "Act" symbolizes that
steady movement.
At the same time, the related idea of legal normativity, with its
implications regarding the power and efficacy of legislation in molding
our lives and minds, was gradually gaining acceptance. These
assumptions, now commonly accepted even by very different
jurisprudential schools, were foreign to the earliest statutes, for the
idea of legal normativity was neither "discovered" nor enhanced, but
developed over time. The gradual shift from the use of Latin to
French to English might be taken to embody this slow process. I
have also related the growing normativity of law qua, law to the
growing normativity of music qua music. So persuasive is the
language of music now, so ancillary are the words it sets-so far
removed are we from the original meaning of the motet-that most
of those who hear a Latin setting by Tallis, or a German setting by
Bach or Brahms, have little idea of the meaning of the words, and less
interest. Likewise, the written law now so assumes the independent
normative influence of legislation, so expects popular knowledge of
its terms-so far removed are we from the original nature of the
statute-that those who question its efficacy or legitimacy are
sometimes seen as a trifle perverse.
These changes were grounded in a constantly evolving understan-
ding of the purpose and power of law, which was by no means
presumed or given. The purpose of statutory law changed along with
lawmakers' perceptions of "the People's" world-who was on the
King's horizon of visibility, how thoroughly his gaze penetrated into
their lives, and whether or not they were perceived as agents, subjects,
or objects. Neither is this phenomenon of changing gaze, changing
expectations, and changing normativity limited to the law. In music
and in law alike, a gaze which expanded in scope and in intensity was
reflected in changing purposes, form, and content.
These techniques of analysis can be extended much further. How,
for example, has the history of legislative form and language unfolded
over the last four hundred years? In considering this, one might
discuss the utilitarianism of nineteenth-century Acts (and especially
the enormous number of private Acts passed to facilitate industrial
expansion) and their construction of the citizen as legal "subject."
One might look at the explosion of legislation in the last one hundred
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years and its reconstruction of the citizen as legal "object." Moving
away from questions of content, one might consider factors such as
the growing artificiality of legal language in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the emergence of the "definition section" as a
vital and increasingly exhaustive element of Anglo-American statutory
law, and the emergence of "Plain English" in recent decades. What
do these elements say about how law and legislation have been
understood, and which values they have embodied? I have suggested
some tentative answers, but clearly much more work remains to be
done.
Beyond specific questions of statutes and interpretation, however,
I have tried to introduce the processes and potential of a nonliteral
interpretation of legal forms. This Article has been an adventure in
words: their voices, their arrangement, their purpose. The motet, in
its finest flowering, embodied an unsurpassed depth, breadth, and
sophistication, and an unquenchable faith in its own force and
authority. The statutory form underwent the same intoxicating
expansion. We have seen, then, the power of language and form in
their ability both to structure and to exemplify patterns of
thought-whether we are talking about the formal innovations of
early modern music, the parallel developments of early modern
legislation, or the linguistic implications of contemporary legislation.
The changing characteristics of the little words of law have much to
teach us about the world of law's writers and of its readers. The
adoption of a formal, semiotic, and interdisciplinary approach to
interpretation helps us understand law and power in two ways. On
the one hand, as an interpretative tool or process, such an approach
explores what words connote and texts look like; on the other hand,
it also acts as the subject matter of the inquiry. To take the last point
first, then, my argument is that one cannot understand the ideas and
practices of lawmakers in any era without delving into the way they
saw the world. But the process of my inquiry, no less than its subject,
has been "aesthetic." In order to develop this emphasis on the
aesthetics of perception, I have focused on various aspects of the
language, form, and "mood" of statutes, rather than, for example, on
their content. The look and language of statutes is an important
means of learning not only about specific laws, but also about the
general attitude toward law and society which structures and
constrains the enactment of specific statutes.
Our current understanding of the law has developed through a
process stretching back over seven centuries and more. From our
present standpoint, the form of modern legislation seems only
"natural"-"Acts" written in "Plain English" (accompanied by
conventions relating to short titles, formal clauses, substantive
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provisions, the numbering of sections and paragraphs, provisions for
entry into force, and so on), forward-looking, purposive, and reformist
in nature, designed to change the world and change behavior. These
assumptions all presume the instrumentalism and normativity of the
law. Indeed, a world without such an extension of legal control and
influence is, for us, virtually unimaginable. But for the one to be
unimaginable, the other had first to be imagined. Through an
interpretative argument and an aesthetic exemplification of it-by
evaluating the changing look and sounds of various expressions of
social orders, both musical and legal-this Article has attempted an
exposition of some of the history and manifestations of that
imagination.
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